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INTRODUCTION
Every year the control of many United States corporations shifts
from one shareholder or group of shareholders to another. More and
more of these transactions are conducted as unsolicited tender offers,
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resulting each year in the change of control of multimillion dollar busi-
ness enterprises employing thousands of individuals.' Yet current regu-
lation of corporation acquisitions consists largely of a curious joinder of
a federal statute designed to regulate substantively only one mechanism
for acquiring corporate control2 and long-standing state law concepts of
fiduciary responsibility developed to regulate corporate behavior in dif-
ferent and more general contexts. By focusing on the five most signifi-
cant problems presented by current federal and state regulation, this
Article will first discuss why the regulatory system is not adequate,
then will critique the most substantial recent proposals for improving
it, and finally will offer alternate reform recommendations that respond
directly to those problems.
Our subject is relatively new. It is only in the last two decades that
the unsolicited tender offer has emerged as an important weapon for
acquiring corporate control.' Unlike a statutory merger, tender offers
commonly are launched without the prior approval of the target's board
of directors." By purchasing sufficient shares by tender offer, a bidder
can elect new directors of the target who will vote in favor of the com-
bination; the bidder can then vote the shares it acquired in the tender
offer to implement the desired combination.
The Williams Act,5 enacted by Congress in 1968, was the first
See Liman, Has the Tender Movement Gone Too Far?, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
687 (1978).
' This statute is the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d)-78n(f) (1982)). The Act substantively
regulates tender offers and also provides some disclosure requirements for other large
acquisitions of securities. These provisions are discussed infra notes 69-107 and accom-
panying text.
' In 1960, there were eight tender offers to acquire control of corporations with
securities listed on national exchanges. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2812 [hereinafter
cited as HOUSE REPORT]. By 1966, the number of tender offers had increased to more
than 100. Id. A recent tabulation indicates that there were 94 tender offers undertaken
in 1982, a decrease from the 123 tender offers pursued in 1981. See Austin, Tender
Offer Movement Off in 1982, Nat'1 L.J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 15, col. 1. The value of the
transactions also increased dramatically. See D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW
642-43 (1979).
4 Before the tender offer movement, businesses were usually combined under state
law in a merger, consolidation or sale of assets transaction. These methods of combina-
tion are outlined in D. VAGTS, supra note 3, at 715-28. Under state law, management
had total discretion to submit a proposed combination to shareholders. The role of
shareholders was to vote; shareholder initiative was not possible. Thus, if a target's
board happened not to approve an acquiror's proposal, it would proceed no further
unless the acquiror or dissident shareholders were able to elect new directors willing to
support the combination. See infra notes 317-28 and accompanying text.
' Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d),
78m(e), 78n(d)-78n(f" (1982)). The substantive requirements for conducting a tender
offer are set out infra note 38.
[Vol. 132:647
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
federal regulatory response to the new style of corporate acquisitions.6
The statute was passed to remedy the secrecy and near panic with
which corporate acquisitions had been conducted. Acquisitions were to
be regulated according to the form in which they are conducted:' for
tender offers, material terms must be disclosed at the time the offer is
commenced and the offer itself must be conducted according to certain
minimum standards;9 for open market purchase programs, post-acqui-
sition disclosure of the purchaser's identity as well as its plans and pur-
poses in making the acquisition is all that is required.10 That dichot-
omy has created a number of problems that we will address.11
State regulation of corporate control acquisitions has existed in
two different forms. First, state corporation law traditionally has gov-
erned the formation and operation of corporations. 2 Charters to engage
in business in corporate form are readily available under general ena-
bling statutes."' Once formed, the corporation is managed by the direc-
tors, pursuant to statutory authority, on behalf of the shareholders who
elect them to office. 4 Directors generally are not elected on the basis of
any platform. 5 As a consequence, directors have enormous discretion,
limited only by the fiduciary duty of loyalty and care to shareholders
imposed by the relevant corporate statutes." These fiduciary duties of
management and majority shareholders were not originally intended to
regulate corporate conduct during the acquisition of contro 17 and, in
' See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Take-
overs, 88 HARv. L. REv. 297, 330 (1974).
7 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 2812.
1 Application of the regulations depended on whether the acquisition was a tender
offer. Interestingly, however, the term "tender offer" was not defined. The lack of a
definition has led to problems in regulating acquisitions. See infra notes 94-107 and
accompanying text.
9 The requirements for tender offers are discussed infra notes 38-43.
10 The requirements for large acquisition programs other than tender offers are
discussed infra notes 94-107.
n See infra notes 165-93 and accompanying text.
12 See D. VAGTs, supra note 3, at 3-4.
13 Id. at 73-74.
14 See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1980).
15 However, in making decisions, directors owe shareholders a duty of care and
loyalty. In the event that a shareholder charges in a lawsuit that a director has
breached the duty of care, the director may assert as a defense the business judgment
rule, which presumes that directors' actions are consistent with their responsibilities.
This rule is discussed and criticized infra notes 317-47 and accompanying text. See also
D. VAGTS, supra note 3, at 221-22.
16 See R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 700-06, 751-
52 (2d ed. 1981).
17 Certain state statutes regulate changes in the control of companies in industries
which have historically been of concern to state governments. Such industries include
insurance, banking, gambling, and liquor. For an explanation of the operations of such
1984]
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fact, they have not provided effective limitations on such discretion."8
The second form of state regulation developed much more recently
and was much more direct. Witnessing the same increase in tender of-
fers that had prompted the Williams Act, 9 many states acted to protect
incumbent corporate management20 and passed a variety of antitake-
over statutes. 1 This direct regulation by the states raised substantial
constitutional questions because the impediments such statutes imposed
on tender offers seemed to interfere with the regulatory scheme Con-
gress had devised. The Supreme Court resolved this issue in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.22 and concluded that the anti-takeover statutes were, in
fact, unconstitutional.23
MITE, and the legal community's anticipation of it," ' caused a
statutes, see Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979)
(insurance); SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (insurance); United
States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981) (banking).
18 See infra notes 317-47 and accompanying text.
19 See supra note 3.
20 See Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political
Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 217-18 (1977).
21 These state statutes are discussed in detail in Langevoort, supra note 20. Gen-
erally, the statutes required that any purchase of securities resulting in the ownership
of ten percent or more of a class of equity securities be conducted as a "takeover bid."
The purchaser making the takeover bid was required to submit a disclosure statement
to a state official and the subject company 20 days before the offer started, id. at 226-
33; to undergo lengthy administrative hearings, often at the request of incumbent man-
agement, id.; to hold the bid open for a fixed period of time (usually 20 days), id.; to
purchase shares tendered during the offer on a pro rata basis, id. at 223; and to give all
selling shareholders withdrawal rights and the benefit of price increases, id. The state
statutes generally exempted from the definition of "takeover bid" programs having the
support of the board of directors of the subject company. Id. at 224-25. The state
statutes were extraterritorial in nature: they purported to bar the making of a bid any-
where in the country, unless the requirements of the state statute had been met. Id. at
219-26. Given their objective, the states had no other choice. If their statutes were not
extraterritorial in scope, bidders would simply have excluded stockholders resident in
that state (who could always sell in the market).
State anti-takeover statutes are also discussed in Bartell, State Take-Over Laws: A
Survey, in 1 NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE OF SECURITIES REGULATION 339 (A.
Fleischer & M. Lipton eds. 1977).
22 450 U.S. 624 (1982).
23 Id. at 643.
The lower courts have warmly received the MITE opinion, applying it to a variety
of statutory schemes. For example, the Sixth Circuit relied on MITE to invalidate the
application of the antifraud provisions of the Michigan blue sky statute to national
tender offers, even though the state limited its role to the protection of local sharehold-
ers. See Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 567 (6th Cir. 1982).
Similarly, the Maryland district court applied MITE in striking down the Maryland
takeover statute in Bendix Corp. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md.
1982). Finally, the Second Circuit applied MITE to strike down provisions of the Con-
necticut Liquor Control Act in United States Brewers Ass'n, Inc. v. Healy, 692 F.2d
275 (2d Cir. 1982).
24 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 20; Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State
Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1976).
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dramatic change in the takeover environment. Under most state regula-
tion, target management was giyen a big advantage in fighting off unso-
licited tender offers. State regulation generally delayed tender offers
long enough for unwanted suitors to be repulsed.25
The federal law that replaced such state regulation allows tender
offers to proceed much more quickly. That gives tender offerors a
large advantage by depriving target management of the time needed to
respond to unwanted bids. The response to that has been the develop-
ment of new defense tactics as target management has tried to regain
the competitive advantage it had under the now preempted state stat-
utes.27 Those new defensive tactics, generally conducted without share-
holder consent, have been challenged by target shareholders as violative
of state corporation law.2 Courts have been unreceptive to such chal-
lenges, holding that the "business judgment rule"20 gives target direc-
tors virtually unreviewable discretion. The real issue, we argue, is how
much and how soon target shareholders should participate in corporate
changes of control.
In recognition of the inadequacies of the present system, the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission" or "SEC") estab-
lished, on February 25, 1983, the Advisory Committee on Tender Of-
fers (the "Committee"). 0 The Committee was directed to identify and
propose solutions for the deficiencies in current acquisition regulation.31
Prepared under an abbreviated timetable,32 the Committee's final re-
port esentially endorsed the existing regulatory structure without ac-
knowledging many of its problems.33 Perhaps because it assumed that
its task was only to streamline current rules, the Committee did not
discuss whether there was a need for a fundamental reallocation of reg-
15 See Wilner & Landy, supra note 24, at 9-10.
26 See infra note 38.
27 See infra notes 266-96 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 317-47 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 317-28 and accompanying text.
3O See SEC Release No. 34-19,528, 48 Fed. Reg. 9111 (1983). The Committee
was established in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1982). The Committee's 18 appointed members
included prominent merger-and-acquisition experts from the business community,
academia, and the legal and accounting professions.
,1 See SEC Release No. 34-19,528, 48 Fed. Reg. 9111, 9111 (1983).
22 Although the Committee's charter allotted 10 months for completion of its
work, id., a letter from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
requested the final report be completed by the end of July, 1983. Letter of Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to John Shad, Chairman of the
SEC (February 1, 1983), reprinted in ADvIsORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS,
REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 134, 136 (July 8, 1983) [hereinafter cited as ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE REPORT].
" See ADvIsoRY CoMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 32.
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ulatory power.
This Article is intended to provide an alternate analysis of the
problems posed by federal and state regulation of acquisitions. By con-
sidering the policy concerns raised by inadequate regulation and by cri-
tiquing the Committee responses to the problems that result from such
regulation, we hope to provide recommendations for a more coherent
reform of the regulatory system.
The Article is divided according to the most prominent problems
in the acquisitions area. Part I considers open market purchases of cor-
porate control. Part II discusses two-tier and partial tender offers. Part
III discusses the increased use of tender offers in negotiated or friendly
acquisitions. Part IV considers corporate defensive responses to tender
offers and corporate raiders. Finally, Part V considers some neglected
constituencies affected by acquisitions.
I. OPEN MARKET PURCHASES AS AN ACQUISITION TECHNIQUE
Congress decided, in adopting the Williams Act,3 to regulate
tender offers as it regulated another technique to acquire control, proxy
fights.3 5 Regulations in both situations require each shareholder to be
provided the information and time necessary to decide whether to
tender or vote his shares;"0 the Williams Act further gives each share-
holder the opportunity to have at least some of his shares purchased in
the tender offer.3 7 Application of the Williams Act, however, depends
entirely on whether the acquisition is structured as a "tender offer.""
Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 455 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d)-78n(f) (198,)). The enactment of the Williams Act is dis-
cussed supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
" The similar need for information in the proxy and tender offer contexts was
specifically considered by Congress when enacting the Williams Act. See HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2813.
" Compare Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1983) (information to be dis-
closed in a proxy) with Rule 14d-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6 (1983) (information to be
disclosed during a tender offer). It is certainly true that there are important differences
in the content and timing of disclosure in these two contexts. These differences and the
problems they present are discussed infra notes 69-107 and accompanying text. See
generally Freund & Greene, Substance Over Forin S-14: A Proposal to Reform SEC
Regulation of Negotiated Acquisitions, 36 Bus. LAW. 1483 (1981).
'7 See infra note 38.
" Section 14(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982), applies to any tender offer for more than five percent of any
class of equity security registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781
(1983). At the time the offer is first published, sent or given to shareholders, the bidder
must file a disclosure statement meeting the Commission's requirements. See §
78n(d)(1) (1982). The bidder's statement must include information about the bidder's
background, financing plans and proposals for the issuer, as well as any regulatory
requirements and legal proceedings relating to the offer. Rule 14d-6, 17 C.F.R. §
[Vol. 132:647
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In contrast, large acquisitions of stock either on the open market
or through privately negotiated deals are minimally regulated. Section
13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act"9 provides the marketplace with
information as to possible changes in their corporation's control only
after a person"0 purchases five percent of any class of a company's eq-
uity securities.' The less stringent requirements probably resulted
from Congress's focusing on the more obvious problems associated with
tender offers and neglecting the less obvious, but equally significant,
problems with open market and negotiated acquisitions of control.'2
The different treatment of tender offers and proxy fights on the
one hand and large scale open market or privately negotiated purchases
on the other merits reevaluation. In our judgment, purchasers should
acquire control only pursuant to a bid to all shareholders.
A. Unaddressed Problems
The fact that open market and privately negotiated acquisitions
240.14d-6 (1983).
An offer is deemed to commence when its material terms are first disclosed to the
public. See Rule 14d-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(a) (1983). Material terms include
the identity of the bidder, the price to be offered and the number of shares to be pur-
chased. See Rule 14d-2(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(c) (1983). The bidder must file its
disclosure statement and open its depositary within five business days. The offer must
be open for at least 20 business days and must be extended by 10 business days if the
bidder increases the offering price. Rule 14e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1. Shareholders
have a right to withdraw any tendered shares for at least the first 15 business days of
the offer, Rule 14d-7(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1983), for at least 10 busi-
ness days after the commencement of competing bids (other than one made by the tar-
get company), see Rule 14d-7(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(2) (1983), and at any
time after 60 days from the date of the offer's commencement. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)
(1982). If a bid is for less than all of the outstanding stock of a class, the bidder must
purchase any shares tendered before the expiration date of the offer on a pro rata basis.
Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983). Increases in the consideration offered must
be paid to all shareholders from whom shares are purchased. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7)
(1982). No purchases can be made except pursuant to the tender offer. Rule 10b-13, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1983).
Federal law also requires that management of the target company disclose its posi-
tion with respect to the offer together with certain other information not later than 10
business days after commencement. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(a) (1983); id. §
240.14d-10; id. § 240.14e-2.
39 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
40 The definition of person also includes groups of persons acting together to
purchase securities. See id. § 78m(d)(3).
41 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
4' This conclusion can be inferred from the fact that large acquisitions pursued by
means other than tender offers received little analysis or discussion in the legislative
history of the Williams Act. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4, reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2814. The disclosure requirements for large acqui-
sitions were enacted with the tender offer requirements in the Williams Act. See Pub.
L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 455, 455 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982)).
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have to meet relatively minimal regulatory requirements raises impor-
tant policy concerns. Those concerns are strongest when massive
purchases are made in competition with an announced tender offer.
1. Competitive Equality Among Acquirors
When two parties are competing to acquire control of a target
company, success should not depend on one competitor's ability to use
an acquisition technique that is, in many relevant senses, unregulated. 43
The different treatment of tender offers as against open market or pri-
vately negotiated deals means, however, that well-advised purchasers
may be able to compete successfully with a traditional tender offer by
structuring acquisitions to avoid the tender offer regulations.44 Such ac-
quisitions may defeat that tender offer either by preventing the attain-
ment of the minimum share condition or by acquiring control outright.
When pursued during a competing tender offer, an open market
purchase program has two important competitive advantages. First, the
competing bidder is disadvantaged by having to conduct its tender offer
in compliance with the prescribed timing requirements. The bidder is
not permitted to buy any shares for at least fifteen days, 45 and may
only buy in the tender offer itself,46 while the open market competitor
is free to purchase stock accumulated by arbitrageurs as a result of the
market activity stimulated by the announcement of the conventional
43 But see infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (proposing that certain pri-
vate deals be exempt Trom the proposed new regulatory requirements because of the
unique circumstances presented by such deals).
"' This careful structuring of an acquisition program was pursued by Harsco
Corporation when it decided to purchase a substantial block of its own stock from
arbitrageurs after Crane Corporation had commenced a formal tender offer for Harsco
stock. In Harsco's acquisition, public announcements were held to the minimum re-
quired by law, did not precede the commencement of purchases, and expressly stated
that the purchases were to be made only from arbitrageurs. These measures were
aimed at avoiding the publicity and widespread solicitation elements of the Commis-
sion's test. The details of the test are set out infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
Harsco also tried to minimize the number of shareholders who participated and to
assure a higher degree of sophistication (and hence, a lower susceptibility to pressure,
another element of the Commission's test), by crossing the trades on the Pacific Stock
Exchange rather than the New York Stock Exchange, where Harsco may have been
required to "clear the books" of the New York Stock Exchange specialist-that is, to
purchase all shares as to which a sell order had been placed at a lower price than the
negotiated purchase price. In support of its determination that Harsco's purchase pro-
gram did not constitute a tender offer under the Commission's eight-factor test, the
district court relied on these aspects of the deal. See Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F.
Supp. 294, 302-03 (D. Del. 1981). In the words of the court, the payment of a pre-
mium, the only factor present, "does not a tender offer make." Id. at 303.
, See Rule 14d-7(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1983).
" See Rule 10b-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13 (1983).
[Vol. 132:647
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
bid.47 Second, the open market purchaser does not have to prorate if
there are more shares available than he is willing to buy. This makes
his offer extremely attractive to arbitrageurs, who want to dispose of
their entire accumulated position quickly for cash. The two advantages
together mean that the open market purchaser will have an easy time
purchasing shares, possibly gaining control, before the tender offeror is
able to purchase any stock under the terms of its offer.
In order to equalize the competitive position of tender offerors and
open market or negotiated purchasers,4 one of two things can be done:
either the regulations concerning tender offers can be loosened, or new
regulations on control acquisitions through open market or negotiated
purchases can be imposed. The prevailing legislative climate, buttressed
by solid arguments, precludes the former. Moreover, there are good
reasons for pursuing the latter course. Those reasons involve problems
with unfettered open market and negotiated acquisitions that are pre-
sent regardless of whether a prior tender offer by a competing pur-
chaser is outstanding. The next three sections examine those problems.
2. Informed Decisionmaking and the Orderly Transfer of Control
The acquisition of control through open market purchases may
foster a frenzied, uninformed trading atmosphere that is inconsistent
with informed shareholder decisionmaking and the orderly and efficient
transfer of control of major business enterprises.
Aggressive acquirors may buy control positions through a series of
open market purchases that are carefully timed to coincide with vague
announcements of their plans.49 In such a market, some shareholders
will rush to sell in order to take advantage of the higher prices result-
ing from the mere possibility of further purchases. Others may sell to
avoid being left as a minority shareholder in a company dominated by a
controlling shareholder who may be personally unpopular or threatens
to adopt radical policies of uncertain result.50
The tender offer rules provide three major responses to the volatile
market conditions that result when there is an effort to acquire control
of a corporation. First, the rules require disclosure, prior to the actual
purchase of any securities, of significant information about the bidder,
4 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
48 See infra text accompanying note 86.
4 The current regulatory requirements that purchasers of large amounts of shares
disclose their intentions are difficult to enforce. See infra notes 98-99 and accompany-
ing text.
50 This phenomenon is well-documented in the popular press. See, e.g., Pauly,
Gulf Oil: Pickens's Charge, Newsweek, Oct. 31, 1983, at 57-58.
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the price it is offering for shares, and the number of shares it intends to
purchase.51 That allows all shareholders the chance to make thoughtful
investment decisions. Second, the rules ensure that shareholders have
adequate time to make their decisions by permitting them to change
their minds for a specified time period after an initial decision to tender
their shares. 52 That provision tends to counteract any initial pressure to
tender that is occasioned by volatility in the market. Finally, the tender
offer rules allow for a more orderly market by preventing the bidder
from actually purchasing any shares for a prescribed number of days,5"
and by requiring him, if more shares are tendered than he wants, to
purchase shares pro rata from all tendering shareholders." These re-
quirements allow an assessment of the bidder's offer to be made by the
target's shareholders, free from the pressure of having to tender imme-
diately. Thus, while unregulated open market and negotiated acquisi-
tions may lead to disorderly market conditions, acquisitions by tender
offer take place in a more informed and open environment.
3. Predictability in the Application of Regulatory Requirements
If tender offers continue to be regulated more vigorously than open
market or privately negotiated acquisitions, the elusive concept of what
constitutes a "tender offer," and thus is subject to regulation, will also
continue to have significant consequences for investors and their advi-
sors. Uncertainty about the precise contours of the definition will un-
necessarily promote litigation and complicate the planning of transac-
tions. Such consequences are greatly reduced if similar regulations are
imposed on both tender offers and significant open market or negotiated
acquisitions.
55
4. Control Premium Sharing
When control of a corporation is acquired, the difference between
the total price paid and the market price per share before the transac-
tion is announced multiplied by the number of shares that were pur-
chased, is equal to the premium attached to the control of that corpora-
tion. 56 Recent experience shows that control premiums may be paid in
51 See Rule 14d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1983).
:2 See id. § 240.14d-7(a).
, See id.
See id. § 240.14d-8. This provision applies, of course, only if the bidder is
offering to buy less than all of the target's outstanding securities. Id.
5 Similar consequences would also flow from a rule that defined tender offers
according to quantitative rather than qualitative factors.
" The theory of the control premium and the problem of control premium shar-
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open market transactions, where sharing is not now required, as well
as in conventional tender offers, where it is.5" The Williams Act adopts
a regulatory scheme that allows all shareholders faced with a tender
offer to have an equal chance to sell their shares to the offeror, so that
the bidder is not permitted to allocate the control premium to a select
group of shareholders, either by buying on a first come, first served
basis or by negotiating a deal with some limited number of
stockholders.5"
The regulation of open market and privately negotiated acquisi-
tions, however, allows the acquisition of corporate control without any
requirement that all shareholders be given an opportunity to share
whatever premium was paid for control.59
ing have been extensively discussed by commentators. See generally Andrews, The
Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505
(1965); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 47 TEX. L.
REy. 215 (1969); Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212
(1958); Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 6; Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Con-
trol Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70
HARV. L. REv. 986 (1957); Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling
Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 420 (1965); Jennings,
Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1956); Leech, Transactions in
Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725 (1956); Lorne, A Reappraisal of Fair
Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1978); Note, Individual Pro
Rata Recovery in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1314 (1956).
17 See S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1119-20 (D.
Mass. 1978).
"" Although sharing of the control premium is an important result of the Williams
Act, its legislative history does not address explicitly the desirability of mandatory con-
trol premium sharing. Its principal policy goal is to ensure that all shareholders have
an opportunity to make informed, unhurried decisions with respect to conventional
tender offers for their securities. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2-4, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2812-14; see also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). In fact, there is nothing in the Williams Act which
compels a bidder to make its offer to all shareholders. Conceivably, a bidder could, in a
partial bid, limit its offer to holders of more than 10,000 shares, to reduce proration
risk faced by those who are eligible to participate. In Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 34-16,384, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349 (1979) (proposed rule to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-4), the Commission solicited public comment on proposed Rule 14e-4 which
would have required an offeror to extend the offer to all shareholders. Id. at 70,359.
The SEC justified the proposal on the grounds that it makes explicit what is implicit in
the Williams Act. Although the implication of the Williams Act is not entirely clear, no
one has actually tested its impact by, for example, making an offer only to arbitrageurs.
" Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., for whom the Williams Act is named,
stated:
Substantial open market or privately negotiated purchases of shares
may precede or accompany a tender offer or may otherwise relate to shifts
in control of which investors should be aware. . . . [D]isclosure after the
transaction [as required by § 13(d)] avoids upsetting the free and open
auction market where buyer and seller normally do not disclose the extent
of their interest and avoids prematurely disclosing the terms of privately
negotiated transactions.
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Respectable arguments favor the imposition of a sharing require-
ment in all control transactions, whether conducted as a tender offer,
open market purchase program, or privately negotiated purchase pro-
gram. First, it seems fundamentally unfair that a purchaser should be
able to decide which limited group of shareholders is to receive a con-
trol premium when the purchaser, in fact, is buying the opportunity to
manage assets belonging to all shareholders.60 When a bidder buys less
than all of the outstanding shares, yet enough to obtain control, "he is
acquiring a business worth more than what he pays in cash, and is
financing the difference by leaving the minority shares outstanding.""1
Yet the owners of the minority shares have a vital interest in the con-
trol acquisition. The operating policies of the new control per-
son-which the minority is powerless to change-will affect the profits
which the minority thereafter is entitled to share. Indeed, the remaining
shareholders are forced to accept the risk that the new control person is
inexperienced, has a poor management record, will loot the corporation
or will run it solely to benefit his business. 2 An equal opportunity to
share in the control premium paid may thus be viewed as compensation
to the minority for the new risks they assume due to the change in
control.
The acquisition of a control block by one person may also reduce
the possibility that some other purchaser will attempt to assemble a
competing control block. The success of the initial control bidder may
encourage other potential purchasers to pursue other companies with
113 CONG. REC. 856 (1967).
60 See Berle, supra note 56, at 1220-22; Hill, supra note 56, at 1012-28. Profes-
sors Berle and Means, with remarkable prescience, first wrote that control belongs to
the entire corporation, not just those shareholders who, by selling their shares, can
deliver it. See A. BERLE & R. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 244 (1932). This notion was arguably applied by the Second Circuit in
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). But
see Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1978) (sharing of premium,
"while nice theoretically, . . . [is] simply not the law"); Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings,
Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 397 N.E.2d 387, 421 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1979) ("so radical a change"
should be made by legislature, not courts).
Berle's "corporate asset theory" is consistent with, yet distinct from, that presented
here. Berle hypothesizes that "control" is a legally cognizable commodity that belongs
to all shareholders. The above theory focuses mainly on the premise that all sharehold-
ers ratably own the corporation's physical assets. This theory is not subject to the criti-
cisms of the corporate asset theory. See Jennings, supra note 56, at 9-13.
6" Andrews, supra note 56, at 520. Professor Andrews posits the rule that, when-
ever a controlling shareholder sells his shares, every other holder of shares (of the same
class) is entitled to have an equal opportunity to sell his shares, or a pro rata part of
them, on substantially the same terms. He identifies the tender offer as a method for
implementing this rule. Professor Andrews adduces several economic and practical ar-
guments in support of his rule. Id. at 517-45.
62 See Berle, supra note 56, at 1218-20; Hill, supra note 56, at 1022.
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decentralized ownership. In fact, if another purchaser had known that
the first bidder was seeking control in the market, he might have made
a tender offer at a hefty premium, which all shareholders would have
had an equal opportunity to share. The open market purchaser who
obtains control deprives all shareholders of this opportunity.
Finally, a competing open market purchase program affects distri-
bution of the control premium. This premium, which is included in the
market price paid by the purchaser, is paid primarily to arbitrageurs
and other professional investors (and indirectly to those shareholders
who sold in the market to them) rather than being fairly distributed to
the shareholders at large by tender offer. 3
Arguments against adopting a policy of control premium sharing
are chiefly economic. Bids for corporate control are seen as promoting
the efficient use of resources and the replacement of inefficient manage-
ment." Allowing shareholders to share in all control premiums may
reduce the number of control bids and decreases the percentage of suc-
cessful bids.65 Obviously, it is more efficient for the purchaser to make
its offer to only a few large shareholders, rather than to the sharehold-
ers at large. Chances of acceptance are much better, the transaction
takes only days to complete (as opposed to the twenty business day
minimum tender offer period), the bidder is much less vulnerable to
competing bidders, and, finally, the bidder saves the expenses of con-
ducting the tender offer.6" Indeed, to impose a sharing requirement in
open market and privately negotiated transactions would be to elimi-
nate the use of those techniques to acquire control, for it is difficult, if
es This effect can be observed in the competitive acquisition situation described
supra note 44. After Crane Corporation had commenced a formal tender offer for Har-
sco Corporation, Harsco itself began purchasing a substantial block of its stock from
arbitrageurs in a so-called "street sweep" transaction. The arbitrageurs sold their stock
to Harsco at a substantial premium over the then market and tender offer prices, while
the company's long-term shareholders were left in ignorance of the transaction and
were unable to participate. Furthermore, the street sweep made consummation of the
Crane tender offer less likely, thereby depriving shareholders of an opportunity to sell
their shares in that offer. See Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 297 (D.
Del. 1981).
In a similar situation, Grumman Corporation and its employees' pension plan
made substantial open market purchases of Grumman stock during an ongoing tender
offer as part of an effort to defeat LTV's bid for Grumman. See LTV Corp. v. Grum-
man Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,344
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
" See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 56, at 715-20.
6 Comment, Sale of Corporate Control, 19 U. Cm. L. REV. 869, 871 (1952).
*6 Those are the costs of preparing tender offer documents, sending them to share-
holders, and defending them in court. These economic and practical considerations
commonly motivate privately negotiated purchase programs.
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not impossible, to apply a sharing requirement to such transactions.67
Regarding the "financing" argument, one may argue that many of life's
inequities do not necessarily result in an "abuse" requiring legal cor-
rection, especially if that correction reduces the number of such
transactions.68
It may also be argued that the possibility of a takeover by inexpe-
rienced or dishonest management is simply an ever-present fact of life
for corporate shareholders, the risk of which they accept with open eyes
when they decide to buy stock.
On the whole, however, we tend to agree with those who favor a
system of shared control premiums.
5. Conclusion
With this understanding of the policy concerns about open market
and privately negotiated acquisitions, we can now assess current regu-
lation of the various methods of acquiring corporate control.
B. Current Regulation
Evaluating current regulation in light of the policy concerns just
outlined leads one to focus primarily on the scope of the tender offer
regulations and on the adequacy of present requirements for open mar-
ket and privately negotiated purchases.
1. The Scope of Tender Offer Regulation
The Williams Act contains no definition of the term "tender of-
fer." Yet the meaning of the term has enormous consequences for inves-
tors and their advisors in the conduct of their transactions.69
It appears that when the Williams Act was enacted, a "tender of-
fer" was commonly understood to be a publicly made invitation ad-
dressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender shares at a given
price.70 The conventional tender offer was ordinarily open for only a
limited period of time, contained various conditions (such as a require-
ment that a minimum number of shares be tendered), and involved a
'7 See Brascan, Ltd. v. Edper Equities, Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 790-91 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
'8 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 56, at 718-19 (arguing that exten-
sive regulation of prospective buyers might eliminate those buyers most skilled in re-
structuring firms for the good of the shareholders).
6 See supra note 38.
7o See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250, 1251 (1973).
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premium over the market price. 1 The ingenuity of purchasers, how-
ever, led to transactions which had the speed and pressure of a tender
offer but which were styled as massive open market or privately negoti-
ated purchase programs. It is not clear whether Congress intended that
the term "tender offer" include these unconventional transactions.72
This lack of certainty has spawned considerable litigation."3
a. Case Law
Current case law establishes rough parameters as to the scope of
the term "tender offer." It is now fairly well established, after fifteen
years of litigation, that large open market purchase programs, even
when resulting in change of control, generally do not constitute tender
offers.7 4 Courts have been unwilling to protect shareholders who inde-
pendently have decided to sell in faceless market transactions without
solicitation.
7 5
It is only when large-scale purchase programs have been accompa-
nied by active and widespread solicitation" or pressure on shareholders
to accept or reject the offer quickly77 that courts have been willing to
conclude that the transactions constitute tender offers. Those transac-
tions are fundamentally different from trades on the national market
system. On the whole, however, courts have been fairly conservative
in deciding what constitutes a "tender offer."
71 See id.; see also Aranow & Einhorn, Essential Ingredients of the Cash Tender
Offer Invitation, 27 Bus. LAw. 415 (1972).
11 See Note, supra note 70, at 1260-61.
7a See cases collected in id. at 1250 n.4.
"I See, e.g., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1341,
1343-46 (E.D. Mo.) (ordinary New York Stock Exchange purchase plus one large
institutional block purchase), affd, 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979); Brascan, Ltd. v.
Edper Equities, Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (large open market ac-
cumulation of stock that avoided excessive increase in price not a tender offer).
7' See, e.g., Brascan, Ltd. v. Edper Equities, Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 789
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
7, E.g., Hoover v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,107 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (tender offer where 100 family members
owning 41% of company's stock were solicited); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp.
783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (tender offer where a series of purchases were made on one day
from 33 major shareholders, mainly financial institutions, at a uniform premium over
the then current market price, conditioned on a specific number of shares being pur-
chased, but not accompanied by any prepurchase publicity, which resulted in an aggre-
gate acquisition of 34% of the target's stock), affd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982); S-G
Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978).
77 E.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 824-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(shareholders given only a short time to decide whether to sell their stock), affd, 682
F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982).
78 See id. at 817.
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b. Administrative Guidelines
The SEC has always taken the position that the Williams Act ap-
plies to so-called "unconventional" tender offers.79 In 1979 it suggested
eight factors which one could use to determine whether or not a trans-
action was an "unconventional" tender offer.80 The factors attempt to
identify those open market and privately negotiated transactions that
place shareholders under the same pressure to make investment deci-
sions usually associated with conventional tender offers. The premise of
the eight-factor test is that such shareholder pressure creates the need
for the substantive protections of section 14(d) of the Williams Act.8"
The test is to be applied flexibly-all indicia need not be present
in each transaction and the weight accorded each factor is determined
on a case-by-case basis, resulting in after-the-fact, ad hoc judgments by
courts.82 These indicia, after receiving a mixed initial review, 3 have
had a favorable reception in some courts,84 helping to make clear that
7 See generally Note, Defining Tender Offers: Resolving a Decade of Dilemma,
54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 520, 531-33 (1980).
80 Those factors are: (1) whether there is an active and widespread solicitation of
public shareholders; (2) whether the solicitation is made for a substantial percentage of
the issuer's stock; (3) whether the offer to purchase is made at a premium over the
prevailing market price; (4) whether the terms of the offer are firm rather than negotia-
ble; (5) whether the offer is contingent on the tender offer of a fixed minimum number
of shares, and, perhaps, is subject to the ceiling of a fixed number of shares to be
purchased; (6) whether the offer is open only for a limited period of time; (7) whether
the offerees are subject to pressure to sell their stock, and (8) whether public announce-
ments of a purchasing program concerning the target company precede or accompany a
rapid accumulation of large amounts of target company securities.
The Commission advanced these criteria in its Memorandum of Law (amicus cu-
riae), Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities, 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), and in its
Post Trial Memorandum in SEC v. Sun Co., reported sub nom. Wellman v. Dickin-
son, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
81 See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 597-98 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
82 See sources cited supra note 80.
83 Among the early cases, one court questioned the validity of the indicia, Brascan
Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); another regarded
them as useful, Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 97,107 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1979), and a third adopted and applied
them, Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
, See, e.g., Polinsky v. MCA, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,761 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying the Commission factors to find that defend-
ant's pre-tender offer market purchases of target company stock could not be considered
a tender offer for purposes of bringing a fraud claim under § 14(e) of the Exchange
Act); Astronics Corp. v. Protective Closures Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,176 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Mid-Continent Bancshares, Inc. v.
O'Brien, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,734 (E.D. Mo. Dec.
11, 1981) (used Commission factors to find active and widespread solicitations at a
premium over the prevailing market price of a substantial amount of target's stock
constituted a tender offer, notwithstanding the fact that the terms of the offer were not
firm and nonnegotiable, the offer was open only for a limited period of time, and the
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the applicability of the tender offer rules does not depend on whether
the bidder identifies the transaction as a tender offer. Such a test, how-
ever, invites litigation, makes planning difficult, and implicitly ac-
knowledges interstices in the structure of the Williams Act which bid-
ders will continually exploit to escape pervasive regulation. In addition,
it forces judges to unscramble completed transactions, which judges are
reluctant to do unless the behavior is egregious. Because of the competi-
tive disadvantage that an open market acquisition enjoys over a tender
offer, private litigants and the SEC have for some time urged courts to
classify such open market purchases as tender offers within the mean-
ing of the Williams Act.8 5 As one noted takeover lawyer has stressed,
[I]f the purposes of the Williams Act are to be achieved,
large-scale open-market purchases to obtain control should
be held to be tender offers. Where such purchases are made
for the purpose of defeating another's tender offer, the argu-
ment for finding them to be a tender offer is compelling. To
hold that these purchases are not tender offers is to handicap
severely the person making the formal tender offer in com-
pliance with the Williams Act and to subject the public
shareholders to the disadvantages that the Williams Act was
intended to remedy."'
The legislative history of the Williams Act, however, adds little force to
those arguments because it focuses primarily on the protection of share-
holders from undue pressure, and not on the importance of a competi-
tive balance between bidders or the equitable distribution of control
purchases were not contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares). Cf Liberty
Nat'l Ins. Holding Co. v. The Charter Co., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP.
(CCH) 98,671 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (applied the eight-factor test to find defendant's
active and widespread solicitation of an issuer's security holders did not by itself consti-
tute a tender offer within the meaning of § 14 of the Exchange Act).
8 " See, e.g., Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission (amicus curiae),
Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., C.A. No. 79-4565 and 79-4583 (9th
Cir. 1979) (dismissing appeal as moot). This viewpoint supported a finding of a tender
offer in Loew's Corp. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., Civ. No. 74-C-1396 (N.D. Ill.
July 11, 1974) (bench opinion), discussed in 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKE-
OVERS AND FREZEOTrrs § 2.3.1.6, at 121 (1978) and in Lipton, Open Market
Purchases, 32 Bus. LAw. 1321, 1323 (1977), in which the purchaser bought substan-
tial amounts of target company shares in the open market and in privately negotiated
purchases with the publicly announced intention of defeating a competing tender offer.
"The court-applying the 'shareholder impact' test-held that such open market
purchases coupled with the publicized intention to acquire a specified percentage of the
target company's shares" to prevent third persons from acquiring control "constituted a
'tender offer,'" although the court enjoined only future block and private purchases. 1
M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra, § 2.3.1.6.
" Lipton, Book Review, 72 MICH. L. REV. 358, 367 (1973) (citation omitted).
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premiums. 87
The Commission has recognized the ambiguity of its eight-factor
test and has proposed both a statutory88 and a rulemaking 9 solution to
the problems created by the lack of a workable definition. The
rulemaking proposal would have defined a tender offer to be any
purchase within forty-five days of ten percent or more of an outstand-
ing class of securities from ten or more sellers.9" Under that proposal,
however, a purchaser would still be able to purchase more than ten
percent of a corporation's shares and avoid tender offer regulation by
either slowing down the rate of purchase or limiting the number of
sellers.
The statutory proposal dispensed with the idea of a definition.
87 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2813.
88 In 1980, the Commission recommended the adoption of the Tender Offer Im-
provements Act of 1980, a bill governing the conduct of tender offers and other acquisi-
tion programs. This bill, which was introduced in the Senate, S. 3188, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 14,059 (1980), proposed to define the term "statutory offer" to
mean all offers to acquire the beneficial ownership of equity securities of a public is-
suer by a person who is, or could thereby become, the beneficial owner of more than
10% of the class. See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM., REPORT ON TENDER OFFER
LAWS (1980) (printed for the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.). The proposed statute made it unlawful for any person to
conduct a "statutory offer" unless that person in essence made a tender offer, that is,
undertook certain specified filing and disclosure obligations and provided specific sub-
stantive protections (i.e., withdrawal, proration, and best price protections) for share-
holders. Exceptions to the definition were made for: (1) offers pursuant to a statutory
merger or acquisition; (2) the solicitation of voting proxies; (3) acquisitions of two per-
cent per year; (4) acquisitions from the issuer, and (5) acquisitions from no more than
10 persons in any 12 months pursuant to privately negotiated transactions. See gener-
ally Fogelson, Wenig & Friedman, Changing the Takeover Game: The Securities and
Exchange Commission's Proposed Amendments to the Williams Act, 17 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 409 (1980).
88 In 1979 the Commission proposed to define the term tender offer in order "to
provide guidance to members of the financial community and their advisors." Securities
and Exchange Act Release No. 34-16,384, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326 (1979). The Commis-
sion's proposed rule would have set forth a two-part definition of the term tender offer.
An offer falling into either part would meet the definition.
Under the first part, an acquisition is a tender offer if the following four condi-
tions are met: (1) there are one or more offers to purchase, or solicitations of offers to
sell, securities of a single class (2) during any 45-day period (3) directed to more than
10 persons and (4) seeking the acquisition of more than five percent of the class of
securities. Id. at 70,330.
Under the second part, one or more offers to purchase, or solicitations of offers to
sell, securities of a single class would constitute a tender offer if three conditions are
present. First, the offers to sell must be widely disseminated. Second, the price offered
must represent a premium that is in excess of either five percent of the current market
price of the securities being sought or two dollars above that price, whichever is greater.
Third, the offers do not provide for a meaningful opportunity to negotiate the price and
terms. Thus, truly negotiated purchases of securities would not be regulated as a tender
offer under the second tier. Id. at 70,350-51.
90 This is the first part of the definition outlined supra note 89.
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Based upon prior state statutes"1 it would have required, with certain
exceptions, any acquisition resulting in ownership of more than ten
percent of an outstanding class of securities to be conducted with the
basic safeguards of a conventional tender offer: a bid to all shareholders
with proration and withdrawal rights.92 That proposal would not have
allowed a purchaser to modify the structure of its acquisition to avoid
regulation once there was a purchase of the minimum quantity of
shares.93
2. The Adequacy of Requirements for Open Market
and Privately Negotiated Purchases
Congress adopted section 13(d) of the Exchange Act in 1968 to
give shareholders and the market notice of the identity and intentions of
large shareholders in situations involving potential change of corporate
control. 4 Whether section 13(d) is actually effective in achieving this
.purpose is questionable for several reasons.
First, section 13(d) only requires purchasers to make the necessary
disclosures no later than ten days after the acquisition of five percent of
a class of registered equity securities.95 During the ten-day disclosure
lag, acquisitions in the open market, or in privately negotiated
purchases, of substantial amounts of securities (in excess of the original
five percent) may be, and commonly are, made without immediate pub-
lic notification. 8 The Commission itself has noted that this ten-day dis-
closure gap may "deprive security holders of a fair opportunity to ad-
just their evaluation of the securities of a company with respect to
potential change in control of that company.
9 7
Second, section 13(d) does not prod~ice meaningful disclosure of
the purchaser's intentions regarding control of the corporation. Al-
though the necessary disclosure documents call for information about
"I See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text. There is a certain irony in this
SEC proposal, given the fact that these earlier state statutes were challenged by the
SEC as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Brief for SEC (amicus curiae), Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
9' See proposed Tender Offer Improvements Act of 1980 § 13(3)(3)(A), reprinted
in 542 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) Spec. Supp. 21-22 (Feb. 27, 1980).
93 See id.
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2814.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
See SEC Memorandum Proposing Amendments to the Williams Act [hereinaf-
ter cited as SEC Amendments], reprinted in Legislative Proposals on Tender Offers,
Beneficial Ownership, Issuer Repurchasers, 542 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) Spec.
Supp. 11, 18 (Feb. 27, 1980).
97 Id. at 12, 14.
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plans to acquire more securities and plans regarding the composition of
the board of directors, 8 the actual information disclosed is not helpful.
Typically, the disclosure which results is a model of obfuscation, rather
than clarity, in part because large purchasers tend to copy the content
of their predecessors' disclosure, especially when it has withstood a liti-
gation attack. Many filers simply assert that the securities have been
acquired for "investment" (though not necessarily "passive invest-
ment") and describe a variety of investment strategies ranging from
simply holding the securities for an indefinite term to cashing in on the
"investment" by mounting a proxy fight and threatening to liquidate
the company if successful.99 Thus, there is a great deal of disclosure
about options, but little about probabilities, and management and
shareholders are left with little information on which to base their im-
portant financial decisions. Enforcement of the disclosure requirements
under Schedule 13D has not been able to change this result.
Third, private enforcement of claims based on inadequate disclos-
ure in a section 13(d) filing has been hampered by the reluctance of
courts to recognize a private right of action on the part of the issuer
(which, as a surrogate for all shareholders, logically should have a right
of action).100 Although the Commission has recently urged a contrary
result in a series of amicus curiae briefs,101 the courts remain divided
on the existence of the private right of action. The federal appellate
cases deciding the issue have held that an implied right of action for
equitable relief exists in favor of an issuer under that section.10 2 The
district court decisions considering the issue, many of which were de-
cided after recent Supreme Court cases expressing a restrictive view on
the judicial implications of implied rights of action,10 3 are more evenly
98 Item 4 of Schedule 13D requires an owner of five percent or more of a class of
outstanding equity securities to disclose his "plans or proposals" which would result in
"[t]he acquisition ... or the disposition of [additional] securities of the issuer," as well
as "[a]ny change in the present board of directors or management of the issuer." Spe-
cial Instructions for Complying with Schedule 13D, Item 4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101,
Item 4 (1983). See also Block & Rudoff, Schedule 13D Problems Associated With
Large Accumulations of Stock, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 15, 18 (1982). To the extent the
open market purchaser can cloud these intentions in obscurity, management and share-
holders are unable to make accurate assessments of probable outcomes.
11 See, e.g., Transcon Lines, Inc. v. A.G. Becker, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 356, 376-79
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
100 See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
10I See SEC Amendments, supra note 96, at 19-20 & § 8, reprinted in 542 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) Spec. Supp. 12, at 23 (Feb. 27, 1980).
10. See, e.g., Indiana Nat'l Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir. 1983);
Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1222-24 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1101 (1981).
103 See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-24
(1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-78 (1979).
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divided.'0 I
A lack of effective remedies further hamstrings private enforce-
ment of section 13(d). The usual remedy-corrective disclosure-does
nothing to repair the damage to market integrity that occurred when
the misleading or incomplete section 13(d) disclosures were made. Cor-
rective disclosure allows a bidder to keep the gains of what might have
been a bargain purchase. Some courts have, however, been willing to go
beyond corrective disclosure. In General Steel Industries, Inc. v. Walco
National Corp.,'0 5 for example, the court, as a remedy for inadequate
section 13(d) disclosures, required divestiture of the shares purchased
during the time that the misleading Schedule 13D disclosures were
alive in the marketplace. Such a result, although becoming more fre-
quent,' 06 is still relatively uncommon.
Finally, the adequacy of section 13(d) may be challenged because
it does not impose stricter requirements on purchases made in competi-
tion with a tender offer. That failure leads to the significant policy
104 The following cases uphold an implied private right of action: Jacobs v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1054-62 (D. Del. 1982); Hanna Mining Co. v.
Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,878, at 94,584-88 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982), appeal disnissed per stipulation,
No. 82-3336 (6th Cir. July 8, 1982); Mid-Continent Bancshares, Inc. v. O'Brien,
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,734, at 93,706-07 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 11, 1981); Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 98,301, at 91,894-95 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981);
Ludlow Corp. v. Tyco Laboratories, Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,382, at 92,302 (D. Mass. July 2, 1981); Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc.
v. Societe Holding Grey D'Albion, S.A., 507 F. Supp. 627, 632-33 (N.D. Ala. 1981);
Kaufman and Broad, Inc. v. Belzberg, 522 F. Supp. 35, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Kirsch
Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488, 490-92 (W.D. Mich. 1980);
W.A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 802-03
(D. Neb. 1979).
The following cases concluded that no private right of action exists: Equity Oil
Co. v. Consolidated Oil & Gas Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 99,425, at
96,434-38 (D. Utah June 24, 1983); Leff v. CIP Corp., 540 F. Supp. 857, 863-65
(S.D. Ohio 1982); First Ala. Bancshares, Inc. v. Lowder, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,015 (N.D. Ala. May 1, 1981); American Bakeries Co. v.
Pro-Met Trading Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,925
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 1981); Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F.
Supp. 92 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358
(E.D. Wis. 1980).
'05 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 98,402 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 24,
1978).
106 See, e.g., Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 98,878 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982) (court
preliminarily enjoined tender offer because of false Schedule 13D disclosures of "invest-
ment intentions" and indicated that divestiture of purchases might be appropriate final
remedy); Financial Gen. Bankshares v. Lance, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,798 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 1979) (rescission ordered as remedy for § 13(d)
violations).
1984]
670 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
concerns already discussed. 107
C. SEC Advisory Committee Recommendations
The SEC Advisory Committee made several recommendations in-
tended to redefine in clearer terms the scope of tender offer regulation
and to improve the regulation of purchases under section 13(d).
1. The Scope of Tender Offer Regulations
The Committee's most important proposal was to require that any
acquisition of stock which would give the acquiror ownership of more
than twenty percent of a class of equity securities be done by means of
a tender offer made to all shareholders.1 " 8 Purchases from the issuer
would be expressly exempt from that requirement. 109 The Committee
showed that it was aware of the desirability of allowing sellers to dis-
pose freely of large holdings in privately negotiated transactions by rec-
ommending that the SEC retain broad authority to grant exemp-
tions.110 The Committee premised its proposal on the desirability of
control premium sharing. 11
The Advisory Committee's proposal also assumes that a bidder
does not have control when he buys less than twenty percent of the
shares but that control will be gained when that threshold is crossed.
The incremental shares which give a purchaser control may involve
payment of a control premium which should be shared among all those
willing to sell the incremental shares. The recommended control thresh-
old results from a compromise and merits extended empirical inquiry.
The Committee report states that there was "strong disagreement" as
to what ownership level carried with it effective control.112 The final
recommendations that ownership of twenty percent or more of a class
of equity securities triggers the tender offer requirement was adopted
because a majority of Committee members found that level to be "ap-
propriate."'1 The report, however, does not indicate why twenty per-
cent is the proper level.
107 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
10s See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 23 (Recommendation
14). This recommendation closely parallels the SEC's recommendation to Congress in
1980, except that the SEC favored a 10% threshold. See supra note 88.
109 ADVISORY CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 23 (Recommendation 14).
110 Id.
m See id. at 22-23.
'a Id. at 23.
118 Id. In fact, the Committee suggested that there was some support for either a
10% or 15% level. Id.
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A systematic study examining the relationship between various
levels of ownership and the attributes of control that attach to them
would have been preferable to the Advisory Committee's determination
of the appropriate threshold level by majority vote of its members. It is
clear that there is no uniform percentage at which control of any corpo-
ration can be said to exist. Smaller amounts of ownership are likely to
have more "pull" in giant corporations where shares are widely dis-
persed than in smaller companies where there may already be signifi-
cant concentration in the hands of management or family holders.
Before new statutory or regulatory requirements are established, there
should be more rigorous analysis of what level of ownership could con-
stitute control. For example, capitalization may be a more important
factor in determining control. Control could also depend upon the per-
centage of shares held by nonaffiliates: the pore shares held by nonaf-
filiates, the more likely it is that a low percentage would constitute
control.
The second question is what is accomplished by this proposal. If
the threshold is set at any significant percentage, the bidder will simply
buy just less than the threshold amount of stock in the open market.
The price of those shares may not reflect the value associated with con-
trol of a corporation because the market will usually have inadequate
information." 4 To then cross the threshold, the bidder would only have
to offer to buy any additional shares from all shareholders at a price at
or near market value. The Committee proposal assumes that to acquire
control, a bidder will always have to offer a premium, but a bidder, in
fact, is never compelled to pay that premium, nor is it compelled to
purchase the shares of the other minority shareholders once control
shifts. Even if the bidder finds that it must offer a premium, it will
only have to pay the premium for those incremental shares necessary to
achieve control. A bidder does not have to share the premium with the
earlier sellers, or offer other than market price for the minority shares
that remain outstanding.
In reality, the Committee's proposed remedy, because of its high
threshold, seems to ensure only that if the bidder wants to increase its
stake beyond a certain level, everyone should have the right to partici-
pate, and assumes that such a right (which may involve receipt of a
portion of the control premium, depending on when the sale is made)
will compensate shareholders for the abuse that may result from the
exercise of control with less than 100% ownership. That result is cer-
tainly ironic. An approach initially developed by the states to slow
114 See supra text accompanying note 99.
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down aggressive bidders115 is being espoused as a "fairness" measure.
Yet it seems a halfway house, endorsing partial bids and exercise of
control through minority ownership without at the same time codifying
at the federal level the obligations of fair dealing which should be in-
cumbent on the bidder once it achieves control.
Finally, while the adoption of the Committee's approach would
largely obviate the need for a definition of the term "tender offer," the
current problems associated with aggressive open market purchase pro-
grams will in all likelihood continue if the recommended twenty per-
cent threshold is selected. For example, it is likely that an aggressive
purchase program that succeeded in securing slightly less than twenty
percent of a target company's shares would remain an unfair competi-
tive threat to a conventional partial tender offer being conducted in ac-
cordance with the Commission's tender offer rules. In this respect, the
ten percent threshold, originally proposed by the Commission in 1980,
would be preferable."' In fact, a better solution might be to prohibit all
purchases of five percent or more except by tender offer once another
tender offer has commenced, and then allow "piggybacking" of the
competing tender offer time periods. In testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Fi-
nance on March 28, 1984, the SEC stated that it has "serious reserva-
tions about this recommendation. Further study of the economic impli-
cations is warranted."' 7
2. The Adequacy of Requirements for Open Market and Privately
Negotiated Purchases
The most important Advisory Committee recommendation in this
area was to decrease the incentives for open market purchases by re-
moving the ten-day disclosure lag in section 13(d) that allows an ac-
quiror to purchase large blocks of a company's stock before making any
disclosure."" To provide shareholders with adequate notice of an ac-
quiror's plans for the target, the Advisory Committee suggested that
section 13(d) be amended to require the acquiror to file its disclosure
statement two days before purchasing the stock that would give the
"1 See supra note 91.
e See supra note 88 and text accompanying notes 91-92.
217 Statement of John R.S. Shad, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, Before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protec-
tion, and Finance 14 (March 28, 1984) (copy on file with The University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Shad Statement].
1I See AnVISORY COMmrrEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 22.
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purchaser more than five percent ownership of the corporation.' 9
The Advisory Committee did not recommend any changes in the
content of disclosure under section 13(d) nor did it deal with the issue
of what constitutes a "material change" for purposes of requiring an
acquiror to amend his 13(d) statement. Indeed, the Committee report
does not contain any discussion regarding the adequacy or quality of
current disclosure under section 13(d), an area in which real problems
exist. Moreover, it is silent on the question of who has standing to
enforce the rules, a question which also needs to be addressed. 20
The Committee made only one other proposal about how current
regulation of large open market purchases should be improved. It sug-
gested strengthening the definition of "group" for purposes of section
13(d). 2 ' The Committee expressed concern that the section's provisions
were being evaded due to the dilution of the concept of a "group,
' 222
and suggested that the definition should ensure regulation of concerted
acquisition activity.2' Unfortunately, no concrete suggestions were
made with respect to this almost insoluble problem.
In its House testimony, the SEC endorsed closing the ten-day win-
dow period. However, it opposed a pre-acquisition filing requirement
"because of its effect on the transferability of blocks of stock." The
Commission proposed instead a requirement of "immediate public an-
nouncement, next day filing of the Schedule 13-D and/or a standstill
until filing."
124
D. Authors' Recommendations
1. The Scope of Tender Offer Regulation
Since the enactment of the Williams Act, changes in the market-
place have raised questions about whether tender offer regulation
119 Id. (Recommendation 13). This is another example of the Advisory Committee
adopting the substance of a previous SEC proposal. In 1980, the SEC recommended
the following three amendments to the section 13(d) filing requirements: (1) persons
crossing the five percent ownership threshold would be required to make a prompt
public announcement (not later than one business day following the purchase which
raises the level of ownership in excess of five percent); (2) the filing period would be
reduced from ten days to five business days, or one calendar week, and (3) persons who
become obligated to file a statement would be precluded from purchasing any addi-
tional stock before the necessary filing was made and until a short time thereafter. See
SEC Amendments, supra note 96, §§ 3, 4, reprinted in 542 SEc. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) Spec. Supp. 20 (Feb. 27, 1980).
See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
"2 ADVISORY CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 24 (Recommendation 15).
122 Id. at 23.
123 See id. at 24 (Recommendation 15).
124 Shad Statement, supra note 117, at 14.
1984]
674 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
should do more than protect shareholders from high-pressure buying
programs. As discussed above, policy concerns such as (1) fair competi-
tion in the marketplace for corporate control, (2) the need for certainty
as to the scope of regulation, (3) the maintenance of fair and orderly
markets for securities, and (4) the desirability of sharing control premi-
ums indicate that a wider range of transactions than was envisioned in
1968 should be conducted as tender offers.
The correct reform of regulation requires Congress to determine
the relative importance of those various interests, particularly in light of
the competing economic efficiency argument. 2 ' At a minimum, how-
ever, the present structure, given the absence of a definition of tender
offer, must be changed because it creates considerable uncertainty in
the planning of transactions and needless possibilities for litigation. In
addition, it permits control to be bought in faceless transactions on the
open market without effective disclosure of the identity and purposes of
the purchaser.
Of the two feasible regulatory responses to this problem, the quali-
tative approach, typified by the SEC's eight-factor test proposed in
1979,126 seems less desirable because it leads to difficult, unpredictable
determinations about the nature of an already completed transaction
that has been carefully structured to avoid regulation. The better ap-
proach, which is also the approach adopted by the Committee and gen-
erally recommended by the authors, is to require any transaction result-
ing in the acquisition of a certain percentage of a class of equity
securities to be pursued only by means of a tender offer made to all
shareholders. That obviates the need for a definition and eliminates, at
least in the large majority of cases, the open market purchase as an
option for securing control of a publicly held company. 27
This approach provides bright-line certainty, discloses to investors
information that is significant for planning their investments, and al-
lows control premiums to be distributed among all shareholders.
12 Expanding the scope of tender offer regulation will likely diminish the use of
the open market purchase program as a technique for acquiring control or influencing
corporate affairs, which may in turn insulate incumbent management from the pressure
of such programs. This result is not necessarily harmful, for would-be acquirors can
still bid for control by making a tender offer. Moreover, any resulting advantage to
incumbent management might be offset by new restrictions on defensive strategies.
11 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
127 If the quantitative definition uses as its only measure a percentage of securities
acquired, then it is indistinguishable from the second threshold approach; to the extent
it adds measures such as numbers of persons from whom purchases are made or a
period of time during which the purchases must occur, a buyer can easily control
whether or not it makes a tender offer. An example of a quantitative approach looking
to several factors is the SEC's rulemaking proposal, discussed supra notes 89-90 and
accompanying text.
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Clearly, the economic costs of adopting this type of proposal should be
assessed before action is taken.12 We have already argued than an as-
sessment also must be undertaken of the level of ownership that should
determine when tender offer regulations apply.
12 9
A difficult problem in implementing this proposal will be develop-
ing the contours of the exemptions for privately negotiated transactions
involving control groups or family members to ensure that such persons
or groups are not blocked in their ability to sell their positions. Also, it
is not clear that implementing this approach would actually result in
regulating all large open market purchase programs as tender offers.
Rather, it might result in attempts at exercising control earlier through
proxy contests.
Finally, this approach needs to be augmented by restrictions on
buying programs conducted amid a conventional offer even if the pro-
gram would not otherwise be subject to the tender offer rules. The open
market purchaser's unreasonable competitive advantage in such situa-
tions should not be allowed to undermine the tender offer even if the
purchase is far less than the threshold amount of shares.13
2. The Adequacy of Requirements for Open Market
and Privately Negotiated Purchases
The most important reform that Congress can make in this area is
to eliminate the ten-day disclosure lag in section 13(d) which delays
disclosure of information regarding the identity of those who have ac-
quired more than five percent of the outstanding common stock of a
publicly held company and allows purchasers to buy stock in an under-
informed market. We support the Advisory Committee's recommenda-
tion in this area""' because it requires advance notification of the clos-
ing of the purchase, allowing the market to adjust more quickly to the
news. Although the SEC opposed advance notice because of a concern
about block trading, it presented no evidence in its House-testimony
128 See Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1983, at 10 (remarks of William Baxter, Assistant
Attorney General). This approach ma; make bids more costly or deter bidders from
trying to wrest control from management by designing a purchase program that would
not run afoul of any definition. In any event, these economic costs seem far lower than
those resulting from a flat prohibition on partial bids or a requirement that a pur-
chaser, upon crossing a control threshold, must make a bid for all remaining shares.
129 See supra text following note 113.
12" This approach is an integral part of the regulation of partial bids. If partial
bids continue to be allowed, and if control premium sharing is desirable, then it will be
important to set the threshold level low enough to result in sharing and to oversee at
the federal level the fiduciary obligations of the bidder. See infra notes 133-226 and
accompanying text.
1" See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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that ordinary block trading would in fact be hampered. The number of
block trades equal to five percent of an issuer's outstanding shares may
be negligible. If a block is to be executed to carry one over five percent,
advance notice should be given.
To the extent that acquisitions of more than the prescribed thresh-
old must be conducted as a tender offer, pressure on the section 13(d)
disclosure system will be reduced. It continues to be important, how-
ever, to ensure truthful disclosure for purchases that surpass the five
percent threshold of section 13(d) but do not cross the threshold that
triggers tender offer regulation. Thus, we recommend that Congress set
forth an express right of action in section 13(d) for target companies
and make clear that the remedy for nondisclosure is not limited to filing
corrections, but may include other sanctions, including forced disposi-
tion in egregious cases."3 2
II. PARTIAL TENDER OFFERS AND Two-TIER PRICING
The Williams Act does not distinguish between full and partial
tender offers. Yet partial tender offers raise special policy concerns.1 33
In a partial bid, the bidder acquires control of 100% of a target's assets
if it acquires fifty-one percent of the target's shares. The bidder may
have a questionable reputation or may be unfamiliar with the issuer's
business. The presence of a new majority shareholder may discourage
potential purchasers of the shares that continue to be held by minority
shareholders. These factors, together with the fact that the bidder has
no obligation to take out the remaining minority, may pressure share-
holders to tender-in the partial bid, especially if a premium above mar-
ket is offered. Moreover, once the bidder has control, it may adopt un-
popular policies, or worse, attempt to overreach and run the
corporation primarily for its own benefit, rather than for the benefit of
all shareholders. The only restraint on the bidder in this situa-
tion-derivative litigation by minority shareholders-is so fraught with
costs and uncertainties that its deterrent effect is questionable.'"
1' Even if this recommendation is not adopted, courts should continue to be force-
ful in remedying cases of inadequate disclosure. For examples of such judicial remedies,
see supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
133 See generally Comment, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of
Federal and State Law to an Innovative Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA.
L. REv. 389 (1982).
I" In addition to his own litigation costs, a shareholder may also be required
under some state statutes to pay an amount as security for the defendants' expenses. See
A. FREy, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO-
RATIONS 702-04 (2d ed. 1977). While there are methods to circumvent these state laws,
see id. at 705-06, other commentators have noted that shareholder derivative suits are
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A recent refinement of the partial tender offer is its use as the first
step in a two-step acquisition program having the ultimate objective of
gaining 100% ownership of the target.1" 5 The second step is commonly
a merger involving the issuance of securities or the payment of cash in
exchange for the shares not purchased in the first step partial tender
offer. Bidders using this two-step acquisition strategy commonly offer
more consideration in the first-step tender offer than in the second-step
merger. For example, rather than pay all shareholders the average
price of fifty dollars in a one-step merger, the bidder may buy fifty
percent of the shares in a partial tender for sixty dollars and then pay
only forty dollars for each share in the merger. A key objective of this
pricing structure is to induce a "stampede" of tendering shareholders
who face the difficult decision of tendering or risking the loss of the
high front-end price. Unless every shareholder tenders in the first step,
some will receive a lower average price per share, even though the bid-
der has paid the same total amount. Those who receive the lower aver-
age price per share have therefore subsidized certain of their fellow
shareholders. Thus, such front-end loaded transactions give the bidder
certain tactical advantages, and may result in the unfair coercion of
shareholders."l 6
A. Regulatory Considerations
An appropriate regulatory response to the use of partial bids and
two-tier tender offers can only be framed after several issues are
considered.
1. The "Fairness" of Partial Bids
On an intuitive level, there seems to be something fundamentally
now facing a new threat from the courts. In recent cases, the courts have extended the
business judgment rule and permitted special litigation committees, comprised of sup-
posedly "disinterested" directors of the corporation, to terminate the derivative suit if,
in their business judgment, the suit is not in the corporation's best interests. See Coffee
& Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and Proposal for
Legislative Reform, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 261 (1981); Cox, Searchingfor the Corpora-
tion's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALl Project,
1982 DUKE L.J. 959. See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPO-
RATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 749-813 (2d ed. 1970) (discusses ori-
gins, prerequisites, and costs of shareholder derivative suits).
135 See, e.g., Lederman & Vlahakis, Pricing and Proration in Tender Offers, 14
REv. OF SEC. REG. 813, 817-818 (1981); Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal
and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 485 (1982). An increase in the
number of partial offers followed by second step mergers was noted as early as 1974.
See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 330.
136 See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
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unfair about a legal system that allows a buyer to acquire control of all
of the assets of a corporation by acquiring less than all of the corpora-
tion's stock. Any such control opportunity, however, can arguably be
justified as simply the result of the "one-share, one-vote" principle of
corporate governance. That the majority shareholder has more votes,
and hence more control, than other shareholders, is the result of a supe-
rior financial commitment to the enterprise, not of overreaching or
fraud. Viewed in this light, the control opportunity reflects corporate
democracy in action, rather than unfairness requiring legal correction.
The minority, it may be argued, suffers no more harm when one share-
holder, by virtue of his ownership of fifty-one percent of the stock, ex-
ercises control than when several minority shareholders join together,
through the proxy process, to exercise control of the corporation. Thus,
a partial offer, although offering a clear control opportunity to the bid-
der, inflicts no corresponding injury on the minority. This analysis
would suggest that shareholders should not reasonably expect any spe-
cial protection against partial bids because the possibility that a single
shareholder could amass and exercise a control position is apparent
when stock is purchased.
2. Overreaching and Looting
Partial bids also force minority shareholders to accept the risk that
the bidder, after taking control, will adopt policies that are unpopular
with the minority, or worse, will loot the corporation. Disclosure of the
bidder's reputation and past business practices may fuel those concerns
in a particular transaction.
The principles of fair dealing and loyalty applicable to officers,
directors, and controlling shareholders mitigate such concerns. Such
persons owe other shareholders a fiduciary obligation not to use their
control position to loot the corporation or otherwise injure the minor-
ity.137 That obligation, coupled with the role of shareholder derivative
actions, may deter overreaching, although it is difficult to maintain that
a system that relies heavily on litigation affords sufficient protection for
all minority shareholders."' We believe that the "looting" concern
should not be dismissed, but should inform the regulatory response to
partial bids." 9
'37 See, e.g., Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1978) (Mary-
land law); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175-76 (2d Cir.) (Illinois law), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). See also infra note 183.
13 The effectiveness of shareholder derivative actions is being seriously ques-
tioned. See supra note 134.
11' In fact, concern about overreaching and looting forms a key basis for our rec-
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3. Shareholder "Coercion" in Two-Tier and Partial Tender Offers
Any offer to purchase stock that involves payment of a premium
over the market price results in pressure on shareholders to tender their
shares. Indeed, the district court in Radol v. Thomas140 recognized that
"any tender offer is likely to be coercive to some degree" and that such
coercion is "inherent" in the tender offer process.14
The use of two-tier and partial tender offers, however, may result
in such heightened pressure on shareholders that they will sell their
interests before evaluation of the merits of the sale. As outlined above,
by paying a significantly higher cash price per share in the first-step,
partial tender offer than in the second-step merger, bidders may pres-
sure shareholders to tender hastily or risk forever losing the higher
"front-end" price.142 Such two-tier deals, although rare in the 1960's,
are increasingly common, precisely because shareholders and tender of-
fer professionals perceive that two-tier pricing applies heightened pres-
sure that leads to successful acquisitions. 43
Professors Brudney and Chirelstein have described this coercive or
"whipsaw" effect in the context of a fully disclosed two-step acquisition
by company P of a target company S:
Given the inability of S's dispersed stockholders to communi-
cate with one another during the tender offer, the act of of-
fering a higher price on tender than would be paid on
merger would have a 'whipsaw' effect on S's stockholders.
Individual stockholders would find it difficult or impossible
to refuse a tender price of $40 when they are also made
aware that if the tender succeeds, the remaining shares will
be merged out at $30. In effect, an announced disparity be-
tween the tender and the merger figure would deprive S's
stockholders of their ability to make an unforced, indepen-
dent judgment on whether an average of $35 per share is an
acceptable overall price for the assets of the firm. Hence, al-
ommendation in Part IV that directors have relatively wide discretion in resisting par.
tial bids. See infra text following note 400.
140 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Radol held that a two-tier pricing struc-
ture, despite its undeniable "coercive" quality, did not constitute a "fraudulent, decep-
tive or manipulative" act or practice in violation of § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
1411 Id. at 1312.
141 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
143 See, e.g., Grienenberger & Walter, Recent Developments in Takeover Tech-
niques: The Front-End Loaded Offer & The Pac-Man Defense, in SEC '83 (1982);
Fleischer, Sun Shines on Bidders in Corporate Takeover World, Legal Times of
Wash., Jan. 25, 1982, at 19, col. 4.
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though the presence of a concealed disparity must be re-
garded as unfair, the presence of an announced differential is
plainly coercive. 44
Deliberate obscurity in the disclosure of the details of the second-
step merger intensifies that coercive effect. Obscurity will create serious
questions in shareholders' minds regarding the value and form (cash or
stock) of consideration to be offered in the second step and the date on
which such consideration will be received. The coercion results from
the potentially unequal treatment of shareholders in what is in essence
a "unitary" transaction-treatment which would not be permited if the
transaction were structured as a one-step merger under state law in
which cash and stock were issued. 45
To remedy that, Professors Brudney and Chirelstein recommend
that the price paid in the second-step merger be required to be
equivalent to that paid in the initial tender.146 This rule is. a conceptual
analogue to the British approach to partial offers and buyout require-
ments.""7 The result would be that target shareholders could hold back
144 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 6, at 337.
145 In this respect, the federal regulatory scheme, by permitting two-tier strategies,
renders impotent state regulation mandating equal treatment of all shareholders upon
management approval of the merger transaction. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 11-
51.5-103 (Supp. 1983); infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, tender-offer disclosures of second-step mergers involving the issuance
of securities tend to be quite limited, and usually do not go beyond a technical descrip-
tion of the plan of merger and the securities to be offered. Bidders generally do not
include detailed historical information, pro forma combined financial information, or
estimates of likely market values for second-step mergers. See Prudent Real Estate
Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1979); Corenco Corp. v.
Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 939, 948-50 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 488 F.2d 207 (2d
Cir. 1973).
146 See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354, 1361-62 (1978).
147 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, which governs takeovers in the
United Kingdom, bars the owner of a control block of shares (presumed to be 30%)
from exercising control over all of the assets without first offering to buy out the re-
maining shareholders at the highest price at which any of the shares were purchased.
COUNCIL FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY, THE CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND
MERGERS 33 (1981) (General Principle 34) [hereinafter cited as CITY CODE]. The
Code is not law in the United Kingdom; it is a voluntary system of self-regulation that
provides rules of professional conduct that those in the securities market are expected to
follow. Its provisions are administered and enforced by the Panel on Take-Overs and
Mergers. See Prentice, Take-Over Bids-The City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers,
18 McGILL L.J. 385, 386-87 (1972).
The Code prohibits the commencement of partial bids without the prior approval
of the Board on Take-Overs and Mergers and requires that the offer be conditioned on
the approval of shareholders holding at least 50% of the outstanding shares. CITY
CODE, supra (Rule 27). The Board is inclined to consent to partial bids seeking less
than 30% of the outstanding stock but not to consent to partial bids seeking more than
30%. Id. The original basis for this position was the view that "a shareholder should
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but still receive the same value per share.1 "
It must be recognized that it is not only the two-tier offer which
confronts the shareholder with substantial pressure to tender quickly.
In fact, the coercive effect of an offer in which the consideration paid in
the second-step merger is greater than the historical market price of the
company's securities should actually be less than the coercive effect of a
straight partial offer not followed by a merger. In the case of the par-
tial offer, the market price of the target company's securities predict-
ably tumbles to pre-offer levels after expiration of the offer and the
remaining shareholders' only options are either to hold minority stock
or to sell at pre-offer prices. The two-tier strategy at least gives any
such remaining shareholders an opportunity to sell their shares in the
second-step merger at prices better than those available in the market.
Commentators have hardly been unanimous in their criticism of
the increased pressure on shareholders that certain types of tender of-
fers present. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, dismiss
the argument that such coercion is improper in two-tier offers by not-
ing that "[w]hat Brudney and Chirelstein describe as 'deception' and
'whipsaw' . . . is actually nothing more than compensation offered to
those who facilitate the movement of control at some risk." '1 9 This
risk-compensation analysis could also be applied to the coercion that
occurs in the partial tender offer context. 50
Although risk compensation may often describe the nature of the.
premium offered to shareholders in a two-tier offer, it is important to
remember, as Brudney and Chirelstein note,1 51 that the premium of-
fered will discourage and may preclude the shareholders' objective con-
sideration of the total offer. This balanced consideration by sharehold-
ers was, of course, the primary result of the Williams Act.
1 52
not be left locked into a company in a minority position without his consent." PANEL
ON TAKE-OvERS AND MERGERS, REPORT TO THE CoMMrrrEE TO REVIEW THE
FUNCrIONING OF FINANCIAL INSTrrTIONS 39 (1978), quoted in DeMott, Current
Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons From the British, 14 n.76 (forthcoming 58
N.Y.U. L. REv., No. 5 (Nov. 1983)). See also Prentice, supra, at 392-93.
148 Similar suggestions have been made for the elimination of coercion in "going
private" transactions. See Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 987, 1005-06 (1974).
149 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 56, at 727. Compare the conclusion that
Martin Marietta's two-tier offer for the shares of Bendix was permissible: "[i]f Mar-
tin-Marietta's counter offer is in fact 'coercive,' it would be because its two tier struc-
ture is revealed all too well." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp.
623, 630 (D. Md. 1982).
150 See supra text accompanying notes 140-45.
15 See supra text accompanying note 146.
152 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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4. Defensive Tactics by Target Companies
As discussed in Part IV,153 the current regulatory system permits
target management to pursue a wide range of defensive strategies that
are difficult to challenge. The ability of management to respond by
protecting the interests of the shareholders may ameliorate concerns
about fairness, looting, and coercion.
First, incumbent management is required to advise shareholders of
its response to any tender offer no later than ten business days after its
commencement.'" Management may advise shareholders of the pro-
gress of its efforts to find a bidder willing to pay a higher price. Second,
federal law gives incumbent management a right of action to contest the
adequacy of disclosure made by the bidder regarding its intentions and
policies.1 55 Management thus has incentive to investigate the bidder's
background to see if its disclosure in this regard is adequate. Ensuring
full and proper disclosure will tend to reduce the pressure to sell exper-
ienced by shareholders.1 "' Third, the management of target companies
may communicate with the shareholders to advise them if the bidder
has a reputation for looting or overreaching. Fourth, management may
represent the shareholders by acting as their bargaining agent in nego-
tiations with other bidders. This process may result in the emergence of
a more trustworthy bidder or one willing to make a bid for any and all
outstanding shares. Finally, management may attempt to frustrate the
partial bid by engaging in defensive strategies such as giving options to
buy stock or assets to third parties.
1 5
1
5. The Economic Value of Partial Bids
The proper scope of regulation of partial bids will depend on how
valuable such bids are to the economy. It may be argued that regula-
tions that obstruct changes in corporate control help to entrench ineffi-
cient management and therefore discourage the efficient use of capi-
tal.158 When applied to proposals to limit or to bar partial offers, this
economic efficiency argument rests on the following premises: (1) par-
tial bids facilitate changes in control; (2) changes in control oust ineffi-
cient management; (3) the ouster of inefficient management and its re-
15. See infra notes 297-347 and accompanying text.
'" Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1983).
11' See generally Jorden & Woodward, Appraisal of Disclosure Requirements in
Contests for Control Under the Williams Act, 46 GEo. WASH. L. Rlv. 817 (1978).
I" See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
15 These defenses are discussed infra notes 266-90 and accompanying text.
15 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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placement (presumably with more efficient management) promote
desirable objectives, primarily the optimal use of capital, and (4) realiz-
ing those objectives will benefit the entire body of shareholders (those
owning shares in either bidders or targets). If this efficiency argument
is correct, any restraining of partial bids seemingly results in protection
only of some target company shareholders to the detriment of the uni-
verse of shareholders.
1 59
Because the theory has such important ramifications, its premises
deserve careful examination. Although the initial premise seems clearly
true, the other three lack empirical support and are far from clearly
true even on an intuitive level. For example, the second part of the
argument presumes that acquisition-oriented companies select target
companies primarily according to an analysis of the competence of in-
cumbent management and that the premium paid simply reflects the
efficiencies to be realized by new, competent management. Clearly,
however, other facts may be just as important to the selection. Such
additional factors would include the particular diversification require-
ments of the bidder," ° the natural desire of managers to expand the
size of the corporate enterprise under their control, 61 the prospective
target's ownership of an asset of particular attractiveness to the bid-
der, 1 2 and the prospective target's ownership of a cash horde that could
provide liquidity for other corporate transactions. Moreover, premiums
may reflect the fact that the price of a company as a choice acquisition
in a publicized auction is different from a market capitalization figure
determined by multiplying the closing price of a 100-share trade on the
New York Stock Exchange by the number of outstanding shares.
The third premise, that changes in control improve management
efficiency, also is open to doubt and has not been empirically estab-
lished. 6 ' Solid empirical answers to these concerns would go far to re-
5 9 Proponents of this line of thinking have argued that it supports rules to outlaw
defensive strategies designed to make changes of control more difficult to achieve. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to
a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1181 (1981).
16o See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 336, 345 (6th Cir.
1982), discussing the reasons that U.S. Steel bid for Marathon Oil. U.S. Steel desired
to diversify its operations by acquiring interests in fields other than steel production.
"' Morris & Mueller, The Corporation, Competition and the Invisible Hand, 18
J. ECON. LIT. 32, 41-45 (1980); Speech by Harold M. Williams, former Chairman of
the SEC, Tender Offers and the Corporate Directors, reprinted in [1979-1980 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,445, at 82,876-77 (Jan. 17, 1980).
162 See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1982);
Whitaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill.), affd mem., No. 72-C-443 (7th
Cir. March 5, 1982).
16 See, e.g., Note, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 Huv.
L. REv. 1028, 1031 (1982).
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move the doubts that currently preclude widespread acceptance of the
economic efficiency argument as a rationale for reducing regulation. 1"
6. Conclusion
With this understanding of the policies that must be considered
when regulating partial bids and two-tier tender offers, we can begin
an assessment of the current regulatory systems and alternatives.
B. Current Regulation of Partial and Two-Tier Tender Offers
1. Federal Law
Federal law imposes only one restriction on partial bids: if shares
are tendered in excess of those sought, all shares purchased must be
taken on a pro rata basis.1 65 Section 14(d)(6) of the Exchange Act 66
provides that a bidder making a partial offer must purchase on a pro
rata, rather than a first-come, first-served basis, all shares tendered
during (i) the first ten calendar days after commencement of the offer
1 7
and (ii) the first ten calendar days following a price increase. Congress
believed that by requiring pro rata treatment during some portion of
the partial'offer, it would enable shareholders to make informed invest-
ment decisions without the pressure imposed by the tender offers which
typified the pre-Williams Act era. 6 '
For several years, state takeover statutes 6 9 masked the effects of
the ten calendar day proration provision in the Williams Act because
those statutes required a bidder to hold its offer open for twenty to
thirty days and to accept on a pro rata basis all shares tendered during
164 Id.; see also Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, An Update
After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017, 1024-25 & n.30 (1981).
Our own reluctance to accept the economic efficiency argument at face value was
anticipated by at least one early commentator who pondered the propriety of the pay-
ment of control premiums. As early as 1956, Professor Leech conceded that insistence
on mandatory offers to all shareholders may block some control transfers. Leech,
Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 838 (1956). Yet he be-
lieved that without empirical evidence of this harm, changes in the regulatory system
were not justified. Id.
165 See Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
167 See id.
16 Senator Williams stated that the purpose of § 14(d)(6) was to "outlaw tender
offers on a first-come, first-served basis and thus eliminat[e] pressure on shareholders to
make hasty deposits." 113 CONG. REc. 856 (1967). Accord Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1, 23 (1977); Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1028,
1031 (S.D. Ind. 1977), affd, 578 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1978).
169 See generally Langevoort, supra note 20.
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that period. 170 The purpose was to end the use of short tender offers
(called "Saturday Night Specials"), often lasting only as long as the
ten-day federal proration provision, by infusing additional delay into
the tender offer process.7'7 Those state provisions were successful in
controlling Saturday Night Specials, but were soon invalidated on con-
stitutional grounds. 7 2 That preemption, coupled with the Commis-
sion's oversight in amending the tender offer rules, resulted in a return
to the use of the higher pressure, ten calendar day proration period.
Recently, the Commission recognized that the ten calendar day
proration period forced shareholders to make hurried, uninformed deci-
sions about whether to tender their shares, particularly when faced
with a two-tier offer.17 3 On December 15, 1982, the Commission by
rule required a bidder in an oversubscribed partial tender offer to ac-
cept securities on a pro rata basis during the entire period that the offer
is open.' 4 The result is that any shareholder tendering during the term
of the offer will have some of his shares purchased in the partial (or
first-tier) bid, even if the offer is oversubscribed. Despite the Commis-
sion's new rule, two-tier offers are likely to continue because of the
coercive impact the higher front-end price has on shareholders. 76
While federal law contains no express prohibition against two-tier
offers, some litigants have argued that such offers are nevertheless im-
proper because they constitute "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
acts or practices" within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Exchange
Act.'77 The only two courts to have considered the issue have, however,
rejected that argument. 77 Those district courts held that, when fully
and fairly disclosed, strategies yielding competitive advantages do not
170 One study reports that 15 states required pro rata acceptance of all shares
tendered during the course of the offer, while Delaware required pro rata acceptance of
all shares tendered during the first 21 days of the offer. See E. AANow, H. EImoRN,
& G. BERSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
207-45 (1977).
171 See generally Langevoort, supra note 20.
172 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); supra notes 22-29 and ac-
companying text.
173 See SEC Rel. No. 34-19, 336, 47 Fed. Reg. 57,679 (1982).
174 Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983).
175 See supra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
176 Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act makes it unlawful "for any per-
son to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact
• . . or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
177 See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982);
Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982). These decisions reject the
argument that two-tier pricing structures coerce shareholders into tendering into the
first tier and thus constitute an illegal "manipulative" act under § 14(e) of the Ex-
change Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
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violate the antifraud provisions of the federal securities law, even
though the strategies are plainly coercive."7 8
2. State Law
States have developed a variety of requirements for partial and
two-tier tender offers that generally focus on two events: the initial par-
tial bid, and when applicable, the second-step merger. Regulation of
the initial bid covers a whole range of responses. Hawaii, for example,
flatly prohibits partial offers.17 9 Other states permit partial offers1 80
and some, in fact, require them in certain circumstances. This latter
requirement flows from state statutes passed in the 1970's that required
persons holding ten percent or more of a class of outstanding equity
securities to buy additional securities only by means of a tender offer.""'
This provision was not intended to improve the position of bidders, but
sought rather to ensure that (1) additional purchases by a large holder
took longer to consummate than if accomplished by open market or
privately negotiated purchases and (2) all shareholders had an equal
opportunity to share in the payment of premiums paid over market
prices.
1 8 2
Partial and two-tier bids are also affected by state law provisions
that treat mergers that follow partial bids or that are the second step in
a two-tier transaction differently from one-step combination transac-
tions involving unrelated parties. Because the merger may involve the
majority unilaterally expelling the minority, there have traditionally
been the following two protections against majority overreaching: re-
quirements that majority shareholders meet a "requisite purpose" test
that evaluates the substantive fairness of the majority's conduct, based
on fiduciary duties owed by the majority to minority shareholders,183
1I8 Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Md.
1982); Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1315 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
Although federal law does not prohibit two-tier pricing structures, the second-step
merger may constitute a "going private" transaction under Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13e-3 (1983).
179 Hawaii Take-over Bid Disclosure Law, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-2(3)
(1976).
180 See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.3772(3) (1979). See generally Langevoort,
supra note 20, at 233-36.
181 See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-103 (Supp. 1983). See generally
Langevoort, supra note 20, at 236.
182 See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 236.
183 The states impose purpose and fairness requirements in an effort to ensure
that controlling shareholders act fairly toward minority shareholders when ejecting
them (in so-called "freeze-out" or "going private" transactions). Purpose and fairness
requirements are based on the well-established fiduciary duty owed by majority share-
holders to minority shareholders, an obligation assumed by an acquiror after acquiring
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and state appraisal rights." 4 The principal differences between those
two remedies is that state appraisal proceedings seek to determine only
the adequacy of the price offered in exchange for the minority
shares,"8 5 while state fiduciary principles provide a legal basis for com-
pensatory and injunctive relief on grounds other than simply an inade-
quate price.'8 6
The requisite purpose test, which clearly offered the better chance
of meaningful remedies for minority shareholders, has, however, be-
come meaningless in application. Its effectiveness has been lost because
courts have held that the sole purpose of benefitting the parent corpora-
tion is sufficient to meet the requirements of the test.'8 7 Perhaps for
that reason, the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 88 eliminated entirely the requisite purpose test' and held that,
to meet fiduciary requirements, a merger must evidence "entire fair-
ness.' 90 To meet this standard, a merger must evidence "fair dealing"
(full disclosure) and "fair price" (established in a manner consistent
with the standards invoked in Delaware appraisal proceedings).'' The
court stressed that perceived unfairness in a second-step merger is not
actionable unless a litigant is able to come forward with allegations of
"specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of miscon-
duct."'" 2 The result of this narrow approach to the fiduciary duties of
majority shareholders is, of course, to limit actual state regulation of the
second-step merger to only the appraisal action and the limited relief
more than 50% of the outstanding common shares in a first-tier tender offer.
164 See R. HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 1036.
185 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713-15 (Del. 1983).
a' Shareholders may not bring a class action for the appraisal remedy; it is solely
the initiative of an individual shareholder. See id. However, shareholders may bring
class actions challenging corporate action for absence of legitimate corporate purpose.
See id. at 701-12.
187 See Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 487, 500-02 (1976).
18 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). The law of other states provides that resort by a
dissenting shareholder to the appraisal remedy constitutes a statutory election of reme-
dies and bars resort to other remedies otherwise available under common law. See, e.g.,
Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (D. Md.
1982) (Maryland); Breed v. Barton, 54 N.Y.2d 82, 85-86, 429 N.E.2d 128, 129-30,
444 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610-11 (1981) (New York); Johnson v. Baldwin, 221 S.C. 141,
155-56, 69 S.E.2d 585, 591-92 (1952) (South Carolina).
18, Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715. The requisite purpose test had previously been
applied in Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379
A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
190 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 703.
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made available through it.1"'
C. SEC Advisory Committee Recommendations
Advisory Committee members argued both for and against partial
tender offers.' The Committee's final position was in fact a compro-
mise rather than a studied endorsement of either the economic argu-
ment favoring no restraints on partial bids 95 or the equitable argu-
ments favoring such restrictions. 9 ' The Committee rejected the
regulatory extremes of outright prohibition or complete relaxation of
regulations and instead settled on two recommendations aimed at pro-
viding a disincentive to the use of partial offers and at protecting
smaller investors once such offers have commenced. 9°
The proposed disincentive consists of extending the minimum of-
fering period for partial tender offers for fourteen days longer than the
corresponding period prescribed for full tender offers.1"" Although the
Committee report briefly outlined the pros and cons of partial bids,
concluding that the benefits from such bids did not outweigh the coer-
cive and potential abuses of their use, 99 the report provided no analyti-
cal support for its proposed solution.
There are several problems with that recommendation. First, the
discussion of partial bids does not address the regulatory disincentive
that already applies to such bids. Currently, the bidder in an offer for
all outstanding shares can start buying shares at the end of the with-
drawal period (that is, fifteen business days after the offer's commence-
ment),20 0 while a partial bidder must wait until the expiration of his
offer, which may occur no earlier than the twentieth business day after
191 In fact, the Weinberger court noted that a disgruntled shareholder unable to
make such allegations must resort to an appraisal proceeding for relief. Id. at 715.
19 ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 24-25.
19 See supra notes 158-97 and accompanying text.
16 See supra text accompanying notes 137-52.
197 See ADVISORY COMMrrTE REPORT, supra note 32, at 25.
198 Id. at 26 (Recommendation 16). The authors strongly oppose an interpretation
of the Advisory Committee's recommendation that would result in the proration periods
for partial offers being tied to the minimum offering periods for such offers rather than
having proration periods throughout the duration of the offer as is presently the case
under Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983). Such an unwarranted view of the
Committee's recommendation would again create the problem of multiple proration
pools and would yield no compensating advantage.
199 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 25.
oo Under Rule 14d-7(a)(1), "any person who has deposited securities pursuant to
a tender offer has the right to withdraw any such securities ... until the expiration of
fifteen business days from the date of commencement of such tender offer." 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-7(a)(1) (1983).
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commencement.2 °1 The Advisory Committee does not explain why this
existing disincentive is insufficient. Likewise, it does not explain how it
arrived at the two-week, as opposed to a shorter or longer, extension
period. By offering no supportive analysis, the Committee missed a val-
uable opportunity for persuasion.
Another problem with the Committee's proposal is that the regula-
tory disincentive reduces, but does not eliminate, the policy harms that
prompted some Committee members to vote for the disincentive in the
first place.202 To the extent that the extended minimum offering period
discourages certain bidders from making partial offers, there will sim-
ply be fewer offers of this type. For any such offers, however, the coer-
cion and unfairness concerns will remain just as acute.
Finally, the question of the effect of the Committee's recommenda-
tion on the selection of target companies should be considered. Recent
experience suggests that some companies are so large that a cash bid for
all their outstanding shares is not affordable.203 For those companies,
the partial bid is clearly the more attractive, if not the only, takeover
technique. The adoption of additional restrictions on the use of partial
offers may insulate large companies from takeover attempts and focus
acquisition activity on small or medium-sized companies.2 ' That result
would be undesirable.
In addition to extending the minimum offering period for partial
bids, the Committee attempted to ensure fairer treatment of small
shareholders by advocating changes in the minimulm withdrawal and
proration period. Under the Committee's recommendations, sharehold-
ers would have withdrawal and proration rights during the entire mini-
mum offering period.20 5 This would result is extending the withdrawal
period, which is now fifteen business days,2°6 but shortening the prora-
tion period, which is now the length of the offer, to the new thirty-day
minimum offering period.207 The idea is that small investors should
have the same opportunity to participate in the offer as market profes-
sionals. To further that goal, the Advisory Committee also recom-
mended there be a five-day "window" after announcement of an in-
201 See Rule 14e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1983).
o The Committee did note that two-step transactions offering each shareholder
substantially equivalent consideration could be excepted from the partial tender offer
rule. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 25 n.21.
sos See Lederman & Valhakis, supra note 135, at 817-18.
204 See id.
205 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 28 (Recommendation
17).
208 See supra note 200.
207 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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crease in the price offered or the number of shares sought.2"" During
those five days, the minimum offering and proration periods would
continue. The Committee's recommendations differ from the current
rules with respect to proration and extension if there is a competing bid
or an increase in price.209 The Committee, however, provided no de-
tailed discussion as to why the Commission's existing rules, especially
on proration, are defective.
The Committee's recommendations relating to partial and two-tier
bids are important, in part, because they reflect an intent to protect the
small shareholder. In the past, some have argued that since only a
small percentage of shareholders, usually those with very small hold-
ings, are disadvantaged by the current regulation of partial offers, in-
creased regulation to protect those disadvantaged should be avoided be-
cause it might deter bidders from making bids in the first place.21 0 The
Committee's recommendations to extend the minimum offering period
for partial tender offers by two weeks and to allow withdrawal and
proration throughout the minimum period (as opposed to a shorter pe-
riod) implicitly acknowledge that federal regulation should be con-
cerned with fair treatment of shareholders even if they hold insubstan-
tial amounts of stock.
Finally, the Committee also recommended changes that would re-
duce the incentives for two-tier offers by equating the regulatory treat-
ment of cash offers and exchange offers.211 Current law makes it far
less attractive to offer securities as consideration in a tender offer be-
cause of the requirement that securities offered in exchange for those of
another company be registered with the Commission.2" The exchange
offer cannot commence until the registration statement has been de-
clared effective, a process that generally takes a minimum of four to six
weeks, given current staffing levels. In order to put exchange offers on
the same timetable as cash offers, the Committee recommended that the
Commission integrate the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Exchange Act in the tender offer context in the same
manner that it did with respect to public offerings of securities for
cash.21 ' In addition, bidders would be permitted to commence their bids
and receive tenders immediately after filing the registration statement,
:0s ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 28 (Recommendation 18).
09 See supra note 38.
210 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 56, at 708-14.
I' ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 21 (Recommendations 11
& 12).
12 See Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
213 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 21 (Recommendation 11).
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rather than having to wait for its effective date.214 These proposals, if
adopted through regulation or legislation, would improve the current
regulatory system.
In its House testimony, the SEC did not comment on the difficult
issue of the appropriate role of the partial bid. With respect to the
recommended differences in tender offer time periods for such bids, it
simply said "that it is not certain that the Committee's recommendation
is the best way to address [the Corrimittee's] concerns. This issue re-
quires further study." '215 The Commission, however, did not indicate
how it would approach such a study.
The Commission rejected the Committee's recommendation on
proration and withdrawal, and recommended withdrawal and proration
rights through the duration of the offer.2"6 The Commission also sup-
ported the recommendation to remove regulatory disincentives applica-
ble to exchange offers.
Other witnesses were less equivocal. Martin Lipton, a noted take-
over lawyer and a member of the Advisory Committee, testified that
Congress should prohibit acquisitions above the ten percent level unless
the purchaser offers to purchase all remaining shares at the highest
price paid by the purchaser in the prior twelve months.2" Lipton's pro-
posal amounts to a flat prohibition on the use of partial bids to acquire
control.
D. Authors' Recommendations
As already discussed, partial and two-tier offers may be very un-
fair to some shareholders. 1 ' At the same time, there are important ar-
guments, although not yet supported by conclusive evidence, that such
bids also significantly benefit the economy 2 9 and shareholders as a
class. Thus, the correct response is to regulate partial and two-tier of-
fers in a way that minimizes their potential abuses, but that simultane-
ously allows such offers to proceed when bidders believe that economic
benefits can be be secured by tendering only for a part of a company's
shares.
214 Id. (Recommendation 12). The Committee did recommend, however, that all
shares tendered should be able to be withdrawn by shareholders prior to the date the
registration statement is declared effective.
215 Shad Statement, supra note 117, at 15.
216 Id. at 16.
217 Statement of Martin Lipton Before the House Subcommittee on Telecommu-
nications, Consumer Protection, and Commerce 14 (March 28, 1984) (copy on file with
The University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
218 See supra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
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1. Informed Decisionmaking
The need to provide shareholders with adequate time to make
their investment decisions clearly is at the heart of the securities laws
and demands regulatory attention. The Commission has already acted
to eliminate the pressures of short proration periods. In revising Rule
14d-8 to require mandatory pro rata acceptance of all shares tendered
during the time the offer is open,220 the Commission eliminated (1) the
pressure imposed by the ten-day statutory proration period to make de-
cisions before shareholders had a reasonable opportunity to obtain and
read the tender offer materials and (2) the prorationing schem6 that
gave rise to a number of proration pools and proration dates. Revised
Rule 14d-8 improves the ability of management to respond to partial
bids by giving more time to find a competing bidder. Rule 14d-8 should
be continued and the modification suggested by the Advisory Commit-
tee 21 should be rejected.
2. Front-End Loading
Front-end loading creates a stampede atmosphere that is inconsis-
tent with informed decisionmaking. The current system in no way min-
imizes that coercion. To remedy this abuse without imposing undue
costs on the tender offer process, we recommend that Congress prohibit
the commencement of two-tier bids unless equivalent value is offered in
each tier. To make such a prohibition effective, elimination of the mi-
nority at a lower price within a certain time should be prohibited.
Two-tier deals should be treated as unitary transactions in which each
shareholder receives the same price per share.2"2 If this alternative is
not adopted, the partial bid should be required to remain open for a
substantial period (perhaps several months) to allow target manage-
ment to find buyers for the company on a one-step basis.
3. Looting and Overreaching
Partial bids pose to shareholders the threat of overreaching and
220 See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
221 The Committee suggested making the proration period their longer minimum
offering period, instead of, as now, the entire offering period. See supra text accompa-
nying note 207.
222 Although supporting a system of traditional state corporation law, ADvsORy
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 34 (Recommendation 33), the Committee rec-
ommended that any state laws interfering with a company's ability to make tender
offers should be prohibited. Id. at 35 (Recommendation 34).
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looting by the new control person.223 Shareholder derivative suits, the
classic common law response to this threat, may not be completely ef-
fective.224 Disclosure by incumbent management of bidders and the
proper use of defensive tactics,2 25 however, constitute important checks
on this danger. In fact, we contend that, because of the adequacy of the
response now available to target management, no additional regulations
are needed to prevent looting and overreaching.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, three approaches to the problems of partial bids are
available. The first approach would be to refrain from adopting addi-
tional regulation of partial offers. The second approach is a regulatory
disincentive such as that adopted by the SEC Advisory Committee. Fi-
nally, the ultimate panacea to partial tender offer problems is of course
a flat prohibition of partial bids.
The Advisory Committee's recommendations amount to tinkering
with the existing system, rather than a comprehensive analysis of the
problems posed by partial and two-tier offers. Their implementation
will implicitly ratify the use of partial deals. Before such a step is
taken, Congress should study in greater detail both the costs and bene-
fits of partial bids. Both tinkering and draconian responses should be
deferred pending the development of some well-grounded consensus
about what the appropriate economic tradeoffs are. If partial bids are
allowed to continue, however, shareholders must be protected with the
following regulatory change: in two-tier offers, a bidder should be com-
pelled to pay a price in the second step that is equivalent to the price
offered in the first.
III. TENDER OFFERS IN NEGOTIATED CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
Because hostile tender offers have attracted so much attention in
recent years,226 it is easy to overlook the fact that most acquisitions are
still the product of successful negotiations between management teams
representing the purchasing and selling companies. 22 The traditional
223 See supra text accompanying note 137-39.
214 See supra note 134.
225 See infra notes 261-400 and accompanying text.
226 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1982, at D1, col. 3 (Bendix Corp. $1.6 billion
tender offer for Martin Marietta); Wayne, The Corporate Raiders, id., July 18, 1982,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 18, col. 1 (hostile takeovers); Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1981, at 21, col.
3 (Seagram tender offer for Conoco, Inc.); Metz, The Unfriendly Tender Studied, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1980, at D8, col. 2.
227 See Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control,
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negotiated acquisition is one that involves a single-step, merger-type
transaction22 approved by the shareholders of the company to be ac-
quired based upon the recommendations of its board of directors. If the
shareholders approve the merger, they all receive the same considera-
tion, unless they seek appraisal under state procedures.229 If the com-
pany to be acquired is a public company, the proxy rules230 apply to
the solicitation of votes necessary to approve the merger.
A. Recent Changes in Negotiated Acquisitions Practice
The form of the negotiated acquisition has changed dramatically.
The use of the tender offer in negotiated acquisitions has grown stead-
ily since the mid-1970's, primarily because there is such intense compe-
tition for desirable acquisition candidates.23 Tender offers are usually
one part of a three-step transaction negotiated by the parties. The
transaction typically begins with a negotiated private purchase, often
from an insider, of a sizable block of the target's stock.2" 2 The purchase
agreement usually provides that the purchaser will use its best efforts to
make a tender offer to all other stockholders for any and all shares
tendered at the same price the blockholder receives. Upon signing of the
agreement, a press release is issued announcing the bidder's purchase of
the block and its undertaking to make a tender offer on comparable
terms in the immediate future.233
The second step is the "friendly" tender offer itself.' Ideally, the
target's board of directors will recommend acceptance of the offer to
stockholders-or at least not oppose it-and cooperate in its
implementation.
Finally, the three-step acquisition concludes with a merger trans-
action that secures 100% ownership of the target.23 5 At that stage, as-
suming the bidder has acquired the requisite number of shares in the
first two steps, the target's remaining shareholders can be involuntarily
53 J. Bus. 345, 347 (1980); Kummer & Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash
Tender Offers, 33 J. FIN. 505 (1978).
12 This includes mergers, consolidations, and sales of substantially all assets. See
supra note 4.
229 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983).
220 The proxy rules are promulgated under § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982), and are set forth at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-12
(1983).
231 See Freund & Easton, The Three Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to
Negotiated Control Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAw. 1679, 1682 (1979).
222 Id. at 1683.
232 Id.
234 Id. at 1684.
25 Id.
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eliminated, if necessary, because the bidder has sufficient shares to
compel the merger.236
Although there are disadvantages to this multistep approach,2 3 7 it
offers an alternative for implementation of negotiated transactions that
is better suited for the present competitive takeover market than the
traditional merger transaction with its incumbent delays. For example,
the multistep transaction was designed to secure for the bidder control
of the target (or at least a leg up on any competition which might
emerge once the negotiated deal was announced) much faster than
through the traditional merger. The traditional single-step merger takes
roughly three months to complete from the publicly announced agree-
ment in principle to the closing.238 During that period, it is not clear
that the acquiring company will be able to complete the deal.239 For the
first month, the target may not even be bound contractually by a defini-
tive merger agreement. Yet the press release announcing the agreement
in principle has signalled to third parties that the target is for sale and
at least one buyer is willing to pay a substantial premium for its shares.
The multistep transaction is designed to shorten this period of
vulnerability.
240
The multistep method improves the bidder's chances of success-
fully consummating the transaction in another way. In a conventional
merger, the acquiring company does not participate in the voting since
it does not own any of the target shares. Thus, the purchaser cannot be
certain of achieving the requisite majority or two-thirds vote usually
required to approve the merger.2 4 ' The multistep purchaser, on the
other hand, is likely to obtain through the block purchase and subse-
quent tender offer enough ownership of the target to authorize the fi-
nal-step merger single-handedly, thereby lessening the risk that the
deal will collapse.
B.- Regulation of Multistep Acquisitions
Federal law regulates negotiated acquisitions on two levels. Trans-
actions requiring shareholder approval, such as mergers, must comply
with the proxy rules; those involving tender offers must comply with
23 Id.
237 For example, at the time the purchaser buys the blockholder's stock, it cannot
know for certain whether it will be able to complete successfully the balance of the
transaction and achieve 100% ownership. The purchaser therefore risks being left with
a substantial investment, purchased at a premium, yet without control of the seller.
23 See Freund & Easton, supra note 231, at 1690.
"I For a discussion of this problem, see id. at 1688-90.
240 See supra text accompanying notes 238-39.
241 See R. HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 1036, 1056-58.
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the tender offer rules. Tender offers are functionally identical to merg-
ers in that both eliminate the shareholders of the acquired company.
Yet the different treatment of each under current law produces impor-
tant disclosure and timing anomalies.
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act provides the Commission with
authority to adopt disclosure rules regulating proxy solicitations for ap-
proval of mergers.24 2 The Commission has promulgated detailed rules
and a schedule of information to be included in a proxy statement when
the vote or consent of shareholders in the acquired company is
sought.243 All material information must ordinarily be contained in the
proxy, and no solicitation of shareholder votes may be made unless the
person solicited has been furnished with the proxy.2 4
Companies will normally decide to announce in press releases the
existence of agreements in principle with respect to major acquisitions.
Because solicitation is defined broadly,2 45 however, companies are re-
luctant to issue more than a bare-bones press release prior to delivery
of the proxy statement. Moreover, the rules require that all soliciting
materials, including the proposed forms of proxy statement, be prefiled
and cleared by the Commission. 2"
The press release, therefore, is the only information normally
available to shareholders until two or three months after the agreement
is reached, when the proxy finally is distributed to them. This disclos-
ure typically overwhelms shareholders because of its size, particularly if
securities are to be issued in the transaction. 4 Form S-14,248 on which
the securities are to be registered, often includes a prolix and unwieldy
prospectus that can run up to 200 pages. It contains detailed informa-
tion about both companies' management and business, financial state-
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
242 These requirements are currently codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to
240.14a-12 & Schedule 14A (1983).
244 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982); Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1983).
24' Solicitation is defined to include, among other things, "[tihe furnishing of a
form of proxy or other communication ... under circumstances reasonably calculated
to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy." Rule 14a-l(f), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(f) (1983). For examples of the Commission's liberal interpretation
of this definition, see Dyer v. SEC, 291 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1961); SEC v. Okin, 132
F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943).
241 See Rule 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1983).
217 It is somewhat ironic that the Commission recognized these concerns when
state statutes attempted to impose a block-out in 'bidders' communications. The an-
nouncement of a hostile tender offer causes a flurry of trading by arbitrageurs and
average shareholders. The Commission adopted Rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-
2(b) (1983), to compel timely disclosure in this situation. The same type of trading, and
the same need for disclosure, occurs when a merger is announced.
248 For a discussion of the evolution of S-14 disclosure, see Freund & Greene,
supra note 36, at 1491-95.
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ments of each company as well as a pro forna financial statement of
the combined entity, a description of the securities to be issued and the
merger transaction and procedures to be followed, and, if available, the
procedure for perfecting one's appraisal remedy. "49
Federal regulation of tender offers results in the disclosure of sig-
nificantly different information at a significantly different time .25  The
information that a bidder must disclose in its tender offer documents
focuses on its identity, the number of shares it wishes to purchase, and
the price it will pay for those shares.2" 1 Little, if any, information will
be provided about the target, the securities to be issued in the second
step, what the companies will be like once they have merged, or even
when or how the second step is to occur.
The tender offer rules also require that this information be dis-
closed at the very outset of the bid.252 Those rules correctly assume that
there will be an active trading market after the initial press release, and
as a result a bidder must furnish the necessary information within five
* days of a public announcement of the material terms of the tender
offer.
258
The application of this federal regulatory scheme to negotiated ac-
quisitions leads to anomalies in both the content and the timing of the
disclosure. In a traditional merger transaction involving the issuance of
securities, the shareholders of the target finally do receive abundant in-
formation, although not until two or three months after the initial pub-
lic announcement of the deai, which typically contains only sparse in-
24 See id. at 1524.
250 See generally Freund & Greene, supra note 36.
251 See, e.g., Rule 14d-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1983).
252 See id.
253 In 1979, the Commission adopted Rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)
(1983), to address the problem of uninformed decisionmaking during the period be-
tween a bidder's public announcement of an intention to commence a tender offer in the
future and the bidder's filing of Schedule 14D-1, the date of which marks the opening
of the bidder's depository and starts running the periods for withdrawal prior to pro
rata acceptance of tendered shares. Public announcement of the material terms of the
bid were often mandated by state takeover statutes. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 627 (1982). Such announcements typically spurred sharp increases in trading
of target company shares. The Commission became concerned that during such periods
(which could last as long as 20 days under some state statutes), investors needed but did
not have the information necessary for informed decisionmaking. Thus, in 1979, it
adopted Rule 14d-2(b) which requires that a tender offeror file its Schedule 14D-1 no
later than five business days after the date of public announcement of the offer's mate-
rial terms, which are defined as the identity of the target company, the price offered per
share, and the number of shares sought. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b), (c) (1983). In
adopting Rule 14d-l(b) the Commission acknowledged that it was impossible simulta-
neously to comply with both Rule 14d-2(b) and state advance-disclosure provisions, and
that the adoption of the rule argued for the preemption of such provisions. See SEC
Release Nos. 33-6158 & 34-16,384, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326, 70,329-30 (1979).
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formation. During this interim period, however, the target's
shareholders must make important decisions about whether to sell their
shares into an overheated market. The disclosure rules for traditional
mergers appear to be based on the incorrect assumption that the tar-
get's shareholders will not sell in the interim but will wait to receive
the proxy statement and vote on the merits of the merger.
By contrast, when a tender offer is part of a negotiated transac-
tion, a large quantity of information is made immediately available to
investors. The tender offer rules compelling this disclosure254 may,
however, be difficult to meet in the setting of a negotiated acquisition
where the terms of the transaction are the subject of negotiation be-
tween a purchaser and seller dealing at arm's length. Based on the as-
sumption that all tender offers are hostile, the present rules require the
bidder to commence its offering period within five days of the public
announcement, so that all information required to be disclosed under
the rules must be made available to shareholders. 55 Although a public
announcement is generally required after an agreement in principle is
reached,256 by the time of that announcement the parties may not have
completed all their negotiations on the terms of the transaction or the
financing arrangements.
As already mentioned, the type of information that must be pro-
vided by the offeror to shareholders is also less helpful in a negotiated
acquisition. When a multistep acquisition is undertaken, it is important
for the shareholders to learn about the nature of the intended merger if
they are to be able to make properly informed investment decisions.
To illustrate the anomalies of the present regulatory system,257 it
is interesting to compare (1) a cash-election merger, in which share-
holders can electto receive up to forty-nine percent cash as part of a
single merger-type transaction, with the balance in stock, with (2) a
stock merger following a prior "friendly" cash tender offer for forty-
nine percent of its shares. Although the ultimate outcomes of these
transactions and their effects on shareholders are very similar (the prin-
cipal difference being the timing of the cash portion), quite different
disclosure ensues. In the cash-election merger, there is no public dis-
closure for the two or three months until the proxy prospectus is mailed
to shareholders; but at that point shareholders have the necessary infor-
25 See Rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1983).
2" See id.
256 See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL § A-2; AMERICAN
STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE § 402; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-
5092, [1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,915 (Oct. 15, 1970).
257 This example is also discussed in Freund & Greene, supra note 36, at 1483-
85.
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mation to make the choice between cash and stock. With a prior tender
offer, there is information published within five days, but it does not
include necessary information relating to the target, the merger, the se-
curities to be issued, or the resulting company, against which the share-
holder can measure the desirability of tendering. The present regula-
tory system, therefore, appears to elevate the form of the transaction
over its substance.
C. SEC Advisory Committee Recommendations
The Advisory Committee did not specifically address the increas-
ing use of the tender offer as a technique for negotiated acquisitions,
the disclosure delay in merger proposals, or the difficulty of complying
with Rule 14d-2(b) when the tender offer is one part of a negotiated
acquisition.
D. Authors' Recommendation
2 58
Because the negotiated multistep acquisition is significantly differ-
ent in concept and effect from a hostile takeover, current regulations
need to distinguish between the two transactions. The basic distinction
ought to be functional, rather than one based on the form of the deal.
Thus, a tender offer which is part of a negotiated acquisition is more
appropriately regulated under rules specifically applicable to negotiated
transactions rather than under rules designed to deal with hostile take-
overs. The content and timing of disclosure in a negotiated transaction
should not depend on the form of the transaction.
With respect to all negotiated acquisitions, the Commission should
mandate minimum disclosure about the transaction when it is first an-
nounced and encourage disclosure before the actual combination. Such
disclosure should be intended to allow shareholders to make informed
decisions about whether to tender prior to their receipt of the proxy
statement. A workable regulatory scheme, applicable in any negotiated
deal (whether by way of tender offer, merger, or otherwise), would be
to prescribe disclosure of significant information in a press release
about the transaction and both parties. Disclosure should be required
early in the process, well before shareholders are required to take ac-
tion, in order to allow them voluntarily to sell their shares and to allow
other investors to buy shares of the subject company, with all partici-
pants informed about significant aspects of the acquisition. In order to
258 For further discussion of possible reforms to SEC regulation of tender offers in
negotiated acquisitions, see id. at 1507-29.
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implement this type of proposal, one of several necessary changes will,
of course, be a new exception to the five-day rule on disclosure during a
tender offer.2" 9
IV. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN DEFENSES AGAINST TAKEOVERS AND
CORPORATE RAIDERS
The defensive tactics employed by corporations faced with tender
offers or corporate raiders raise significant questions about whether ex-
isting federal and state law provides adequate scrutiny of such tac-
tics.2 60 The most notable example of such behavior occurred after Ben-
dix Corporation made a tender offer for the common stock of Martin
Marietta Corporation."' To fend off the Bendix bid, Martin Marietta
responded by borrowing enormous sums and commenced a tender offer
for Bendix. 2 2 Federal and state law subjected that counter tender offer
to no serious scrutiny. Federal law was not violated since Martin Mar-
ietta committed no disclosure violation.2 63 The district court also found
that no case had been made under state law.2"
The Bendix litigation indicates the lengths to which incumbent
management can go in an effort to resist a tender offer. The current
lack of consensus265 regarding the appropriate behavior of management
under siege permits the survival instinct to govern the response of target
companies. Unless corporate managers are to be given unfettered dis-
cretion in responding to tender offers, thereby threatening the value of
288 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
260 See, e.g., Murray, Do Mergers Make Sense?, Dun's Business Month, Oct.
1982, at 88; Proposed Purchase of Marathon Oil Co. by Mobil Oil Corp.: Joint Hear-
ings Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
261 See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982).
262 A Bendix lawyer said of Martin Marietta management: "They've debilitated
their corporation, depleted their earnings. They paid an enormous price, and by their
standards, they won." Masters, Lawyers Debate Best and Worst of Bendix Takeover
Manuevers, Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 11, 1982, at 1 (quoting Mr. Harvey Pitt).
The price to which the lawyer referred was not paid by Martin Marietta's manage-
ment, but rather by its shareholders.
282 See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982).
28 In denying a motion by Bendix for a preliminary injunction against the offer,
Judge Young found "no credible evidence ... that ... [Martin] Marietta's board was
not acting ... in furtherance of what they reasonably believed to be a good corporate
purpose," that is, keeping the management of Bendix-who Martin Marietta's board
believed to have "little managerial competence or experience in Marietta's busi-
ness,"-from taking control of Martin Marietta. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 633-34 (D. Md. 1982).
265 The American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project has not devel-
oped rules regarding the duty of loyalty in takeover situations, even though it has devel-
oped elaborate rules for situations not involving a tender offer.
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shareholder investments, regulations must clearly limit the range of
permissible defensive tactics.
This section: (1) briefly reviews recent developments in defensive
tactics; (2) discusses the orientation of federal securities law (which re-
flects a policy judgment not to review the substantive merits of business
decisions but to rely instead upon full corporate disclosure); (3) criti-
cizes the state business judgment rule because it fails to provide ade-
quate legal standards for evaluating defensive tactics, and (4) presents
and evaluates proposed changes in the regulatory system.
A. New Defensive Developments
1. Defending Against Tender Offers
Defensive strategies fall into two categories: financial transactions
designed to reduce the attractiveness of a corporation to a bidder" 6 and
structural defenses embedded in the bylaws or charter of the corpora-
tion designed to make changes in control more difficult to accomplish.
a. Financial Defenses
Virtually all financial defenses are undertaken only after a corpo-
ration is faced with a takeover bid, either by tender offer or open mar-
ket purchase program. Those defenses may involve any of a variety of
courses of action. Management may decide to liquidate the company in
whole or in part (the classic "scorched earth" defense);20 7' it may decide
to sell an attractive subsidiary or property to a friendly suitor who may
subsequently make an offer which it favors (the so-called "Crown
Jewel" sale); 268 it may decide to give a friendly suitor an option to buy
treasury shares at an attractive price;2 9 it may elect to start a tender
offer or open market purchase program for its own shares (in order to
make it more difficult for the raider to meet minimum share condi-
26 See infra notes 267-76 and accompanying text. A variant of this first category
involves the increased use of special compensation agreements, also known as "golden
parachutes," designed to give target officers and employees a measure of financial se-
curity if they lose their positions as the result of a change in control.
267 E.g., Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
268 E.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1982);
Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Whittaker Corp. v.
Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
26l E.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1982); Heit
v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1977); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d
769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
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tions);270 or it may choose to launch a tender offer for the bidder (the
so-called "Pac Man" defense). 71
Such transactions may frustrate a bid in several ways. First, they
may change the target's financial condition in a manner which makes it
less attractive (substantial indebtedness may be incurred or an attractive
asset or subsidiary may be sold). Second, the issuer tender offer or re-
purchase program for its own shares may cause the shares to trade at a
price in excess of the tender price, thus forcing the raider to increase its
price to remain competitive.27 2
Finally, certain of these transactions may result in the accumula-
tion of large amounts of target stock in friendly hands who are unwill-
ing to tender to the raider. This accumulation may directly defeat the
hostile bid by making it impossible for the bidder to buy a controlling
interest. Or it may indirectly defeat the raider by acquiring stock for
the corporate treasury which can be used in connection with a subse-
quent issuance of shares as a defensive action or by setting the stage for
an issuer or white knight tender offer.
27
Each of these financial defenses may be implemented by the board
of directors without shareholder approval,27 4 yet may negatively impact
the shareholders of the subject company in at least two ways. First,
they may, by frustrating the raider's bid, deprive at least some target
company shareholders of the opportunity to sell their shares at a
profit.27 5 Second, the defenses may weaken the target's financial condi-
270 E.g., Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1978); Pogo Producing Co.
v. Northwest Indus., Civ. No. H-83-2667 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 1983) (self tender offer);
LTV Corp. v. Grumman Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,344 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1981) (open market purchases); Cheff v. Mathes,
199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
2171 Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982); see
also Getschow & Metz, Houston Natural and Coastal End Takeover Offers, Wall St.
J., Feb. 14, 1984, at 3, col. 1 (counterbid by Houston Natural Gas to Coastal's tender
offer; both bids settled by Houston Natural buying out Coastal's position). -
27'2 The target also benefits from this response because the shares it is able to
purchase may include "loose stock" from arbitrageurs and others that would likely be
tendered to the bidder.
27 For example, if 33% of the outstanding stock is in friendly hands, a white
knight needs to acquire only slightly more than 17% to prevent the raider from taking
control. If the issuer buys another 17% of the stock and retires it, the percentage hold-
ing of the friendly holder automatically goes to 38% as a result of the reduction of
outstanding shares; and if the issuer buys and retires 33%, the holdings of the friendly
holder increase to 50% of the then outstanding securities.
2174 See Lipton, supra note 164, at 1025.
"7I See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 159. The opposing argument is that
such maneuvers sometimes are necessary to procure a friendly bidder willing to make a
higher bid. See generally Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers,
95 HARV. L. REv. 1028 (1982); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35
Bus. LAW. 101 (1979).
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tion with the result that the market may value the target's shares at a
lower price in the aftermath of the takeover battle.
Another result, as well as the purpose, of any successful defense is,
of course, the target's continued independence as a business entity and
the continuing tenure of its directors and top managers. Whether or not
the price paid for independence is (or is likely to be) too high in terms
of shareholder welfare is a frequent topic of litigation under federal and
state law.178 The absence of clear guidelines as to what directors should
do compounds the problem by encouraging extreme actions by manage-
ment that often have no rational connection to the achievement of
shareholder interests.
b. Structural Defenses
Defenses in this second category are usually pursued well before a
tender offer is commenced. They are intended to make it much more
difficult to ratify a change in corporate control. Several examples indi-
cate the range of structural responses.
First, the directors may classify the board into two or more sub-
groups whose terms of office expire at different times.27 7 The board
may also recommend to the shareholders that they add a supermajority
provision to the charter to provide that more than the minimum vote
required by law (usually a majority of two-thirds) be obtained to ap-
prove any merger with or sale of substantially all of the target's assets
to an entity owning more than a certain percentage of the target's stock
(usually ten percent).2 78 An interesting paradox of the supermajority
provision is that it can be installed with the vote of only a simple ma-
jority of the shareholding body.279
Another response is the "fair price" provision, which sets forth
pricing 80 and procedural 2" requirements for the purchase of shares,
2716 For a most egregious example, see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454.U.S. 1092 (1981). Such battles are often conducted
with a certain irony. The directors believe it is in the best interests of the company to
be independent, yet in many instances the shareholders may very well be willing to
accept the premium proffered if given the chance.
17 This action requires that even a majority shareholder must wait for at least
two successive annual meetings to elect a majority of the board, presuming three classes
of equal size. This is an important strategy if a partial bid is expected. In reality, most
directors in all likelihood would resign once there was a new controlling shareholder
rather than spend the subsequent year in open warfare.
578 The deterrent effect of a supermajority provision is particularly. high where
management controls enough shares to block the "supermajority" vote even if the of-
feror tenders for all outstanding shares.
"0 It then requires, of course, a supermajority to remove such a provision.
Uo A minimum price provision, the most common fair price formula, provides that
the amount of consideration that each stockholder receives be no less than the
[Footnote 281 appears on page 704]
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which, if met, result in the supermajority voting requirement not being
applicable. Those provisions deter front-end loaded tender offers by
forcing the bidder to pay more in the second step.282
Related to "fair price" provisions are compulsory redemption pro-
visions which grant stockholders the right to cause a corporation to re-
purchase their shares at a particular price. 23 They are triggered when
a-tender offer for more than a specified percentage of the corporation's
outstanding shares succeeds despite the disapproval of the target's board
of directors.28' The potential expense associated with compulsory re-
demption provisions is designed to encourage potential offerors to nego-
tiate with management. Potentially, compulsory redemption provisions
have a broader deterrent effect than either supermajority or fair price
provisions because compulsory redemption raises the price of the trans-
action and also removes the offeror's ability to forego a second-step
transaction. Despite these advantages to incumbent management, com-
pulsory redemption provisions are far less common than fair price pro-
visions, in part because they raise far more questions as to their
equivalent of the highest consideration received by any stockholder for his stock. A
minimum market premium clause is frequently used in combination with minimum
price provisions and requires that the ratio of the offeror's premium to the fair market
value of the target's stock immediately prior to the date of the first public announce-
ment of the acquisition be at least as great as the ratio of the highest price paid by the
offeror at any time for the target's stock to the fair market value of such stock immedi-
ately prior to the commencement of the acquisition of the target's stock by the offeror.
Premium to book value is another formula used in fair price amendments providing
that any offer be in excess of stated book value.
281 Fair price amendments generally contain various procedural requirements un-
related to price that must also be fulfilled by an offeror to avoid the prescribed
supermajority vote requirement. Dividend floors are frequently set in fair price amend-
ments as a means to prevent the bidder, after obtaining control via a first-step tender
offer, from attempting to depress the market price of the voting stock prior to proposing
a second-step merger. The bidder is prevented from reducing the dividends of the tar-
get's stock and thereby reducing the consideration required to be paid pursuant to the
minimum price requirements. Fair price amendments often provide that, regardless of
the price offered, supermajority requirements will be imposed if the bidder acquires
any additional shares of voting stock in any transaction after it becomes a controlling
shareholder. A common procedural requirement is a provision designed to prevent self-
dealing providing that a new controlling shareholder may not receive loans, financial
assistance, or tax advantages from the target (other than proportionately, solely in its
capacity as a stockholder). Provisions against asset transfers are designed to discourage
the slow liquidation and acquisition of a target by a new controlling shareholder.
"I These provisions are especially well suited to discourage front-end loaded
tender offers or partial bids because they ensure fair treatment of minority shareholders
after a partial bid by restricting the price payable in the second-step merger.
2" The repurchase price can be set in a manner similar to that of "fair price"
provisions, including: (i) highest per share price paid for any share of stock previously
acquired; or (ii) specified premiums to market or book value per common share.
As with fair price amendments, the compulsory redemption provision can dis-
courage two-tiered offers by requiring an offeror to buy a greater number of shares, at
a higher price, than it would otherwise acquire.
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validity.2 8 5
The board may also defend by seeking shareholder approval to
amend the corporate charter to increase the number of authorized com-
mon or preferred shares for later issuance into friendly hands (some-
times in conjunction with a "Crown Jewel" asset option). 88 Or the
board may distribute to its common shareholders a dividend in the form
of a convertible preferred stock (assuming the board has previously re-
quested shareholder approval of the creation of a class of preferred to
be issued upon such terms and with such preferences as may be set by
the board) that contains a "flipover" provision permitting, in the event
of a tender offer followed by a freezeout merger, the preferred to be
convertible into the common stock of the bidder, thus presenting the
would-be bidders with the prospect of earnings dilution if the tender
offer is successful (the so-called "poison piJl" dividend). 2 17 The pre-
ferred is usually noncallable for ten or fifteen years, has a dividend rate
based on the common stock such that there is a disincentive to convert,
and, if a third party acquires a significant percentage of the issuer's
common stock, is redeemable at the highest price paid by such third
party in transactions to acquire its position.2 8 It is also possible to in-
clude among the terms of the preferred stock various shark-repellant or
supermajority provisions. However, to the extent the shareholders have
not voted to approve these provisions, they have generally not been in-
cluded to date.
These examples suggest why structural defenses-differ significantly
from the financial defenses: structural defenses generally reflect the
consent of some of the shareholders. 89 In fact, the likelihood of share-
285 The validity of compulsory redemption provisions has not been tested in the
courts. Both New York and Delaware law seem to prohibit the issuance of common
stock redeemable at the option of the holder. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 512 (Mc-
Kinney 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(b) (1983). The redemption of stock
would also be prohibited if the repurchase would impair a corporation's capital. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513 (McKinney 1982).
Furthermore, if the redemption required a reduction in capital or the liquidation of
assets, the procedure would be subject to challenge on the ground that the expenditures
constituted waste and failed to serve a valid corporate purpose, despite charter
authorization.
2 8 See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1982), where
Marathon issued stock and "Crown Jewel" asset options to U.S. Steel in order to in-
duce it to make a friendly bid. See also Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357
(2d Cir. 1980).
287 See, e.g., Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, No. 5798 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 1979).
288 A recent innovation is to have the "flipover provision" permit conversion not
into the bidder's common but into a new class of convertible preferred.
289 Such shareholder support, evidenced by placement of the structural defenses in
the corporate charter, makes such corporations substantially less vulnerable to legal
attack. Compare Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 506
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holder approval of a particular defense is obviously a crucial factor in
the directors' decision about whether to submit the structural changes
to shareholders for a vote. Shareholders, especially institutional inves-
tors, recently have shown reluctance to vote in favor of such
provisions.'"
2. Defending Against Corporate Raiders
In the typical corporate raider scheme, an investor buys a signifi-
cant block of a company's stock on the open market, and then an-
nounces that he wants to be bought out by the company at a premium.
This attempt to "greenmail" the company raises serious concerns. If
the target's management balks, the greenmailer can threaten to mount a
proxy fight either to elect new management or to "bust up" the com-
pany, i.e., sell the assets piecemeal, or launch a tender offer in order to
win control and then liquidate the company. The goal is so to preoc-
cupy management that it will buy out the investor's shares in order not
to be diverted from running the company's business. In defense of man-
agement, the assault can be so time consuming, the publicity (and
greenmailers relish publicity) so unfavorable, that management may re-
alistically have no choice but to find a buyer for the company or buy
out the greenmailer's position. It is difficult to justify the greenmail
practice on other than the most crass "free market" rationale.29
Current regulation does not deter greenmail transactions. The
(D. Del. 1982) (invalidating bylaw restricting alien ownership of stock adopted amid
tender offer by Canadian company on ground that there was no shareholder approval)
and Coalition to Advocate Pub. Util. Responsibility, Inc. v. Engels, 364 F. Supp. 1202
(D. Minn. 1973) (invalidating an attempt to reduce the number of directors immedi-
ately prior to annual meeting) with Seibert v. Milton Bradley, Inc., 380 Mass. 656, 405
N.E.2d 131 (1980) (upholding a supermajority bylaw, which provided that vote of at
least 75% of the outstanding shares was necessary for the adoption of a merger propo-
sal, chiefly on the ground that the shareholders had approved the bylaw). Moreover,
under most state corporation laws, shareholders have or retain the right to amend the
bylaws, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 601(a) (McKinney 1982), so that there may be
an inference of continuing shareholder approval when the structural defenses are re-
tained in the bylaws over time.
Defensive transactions involving issuances of shares may be less vulnerable since
shareholders have not only voted on the capitalization, but in the case of preferred
explicitly granted the directors discretion as to the timing and terms of issue. On the
other hand, the legitimacy of such shareholder approval is much more tenuous than it
is when supermajority provisions are submitted to the shareholders for a vote.
290 See, e.g., Masters, Interest, Doubts Sparked by Season's Proxy Contests, Legal
Times of Wash., May 23, 1983, at 1, col. 3; see also Blustein, Measures to Discourage
Takeovers Stir Controversy at Annual Meetings, Wall St. J., April 18, 1983, at 29, col.
1.
291 See Icahn, Stop the Oppression of Shareholders, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, at
2F, col.1.
[Vol. 132:647
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
stock exchanges have not adopted any rules prohibiting it.2 2 State blue
sky laws or corporate laws do not require that shareholders approve the
transaction, with the result that there is little check on the price man-
agement may pay to rid itself of the meddlesome holder.'" Any subse-
quent derivative actions are not likely to succeed given the wide latitude
the "business judgment" rule accords to good faith decisions of the
board.2  Indeed, the case law seems to suggest that the worse the
"greenmailer" behaves, the worse his reputation, the easier it will be
for the board to withstand subsequent attack on its decision to repur-
chase shares at a high premium. Such a rule of law encourages the
bidder to cultivate the reputation of a pirate. Compounding the prob-
lem, courts have struck down on commerce clause grounds state efforts
to deal with the problem through takeover statutes." 6
B. Current Regulation of Defensive Tactics
We will now briefly outline how takeover defenses are regulated
at both the federal and state level. These regulations are most relevant
to the financial defenses pursued by directors of corporations that do
not have existing structural defenses approved by shareholders.
2" But cf. Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Oh. 1977) (indicating that the
New York Stock Exchange took the position that management should obtain share-
holder approval of proposed repurchase of shares held by vexatious shareholder).
29 See ADVISORy COMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 38-39.
2 See infra notes 317-47 and accompanying text.
29 Federal law imposes no substantive regulation on such practices. All that is
called for is full disclosure of the greenmailer's "plans and proposals," which the green-
mailer is delighted to make, for compliance seems to further the greenmailer's objec-
tives. The recent case of Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP'. (CCH) T 99,043 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 1983), is a good example of this effect
and demonstrates the ineffectiveness of a disclosure system dealing with subjective in-
tentions. The Icahn group filed a Schedule 13D that bluntly stated the group's alter-
nate intentions of, among others, either (i) seeking control or (ii) seeking to sell the
acquired shares to the issuer. Id. at 94,955 n.2. The Fourth Circuit termed the disclos-
ure "extraordinarily frank," and held that it did not violate § 13(d) or the antifraud
provisions. Id. at 94,959. The Court stated:
We doubt that such frankness will be found to violate section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 and pause only to highlight a potential irony. Were Icahn's
conduct to be held unlawful, we would be left with the peculiar result that
the tender offeror who openly informs the investment community that a
buy-out is a distinct possibility is dammed [sic] while the tender offeror
who conceals the same information proceeds unimpugned.
Id.
2" See Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 542 F. Supp. 231 (D. Mass.), re-
manded, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (vacating preliminary injunction for further
factfinding); Vista Resources Inc. v. Connolly, No. 82-0707-MC (D. Mass. March 26,
1982) (entering temporary restraining order against enforcement of statute).
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1. Federal Abstention from Regulation of Defense Tactics:
The Santa Fe Doctrine
During the early and mid-1970's, it was thought that the federal
securities laws placed substantive limits on corporate responses to ac-
quisitions. It was argued that the Commission had the power to im-
pose, and section 14(e) itself contained implicitly, substantive standards
applicable to defensive tactics by directors to prevent fraud or the possi-
bility of fraud. For example, in Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc. v.
Milgo Electronic Corp.,29 7 the district court held that a subject com-
pany may have violated section 14(e) by issuing a large block of stock
to a friendly suitor without shareholder approval solely as a defensive
measure against a hostile bid."' 8
Santa Fe Industries v. Green29 brought an abrupt end to the
broad readings of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws and
sharply limited the ability of a plaintiff to challenge corporate decision-
making.300 The case presented the claim of minority shareholdeis that a
corporation had violated Rule 10b-5 because the terms of a proposed
short-form merger (which could be implemented without a shareholder
vote) were inherently unfair.301 The Second Circuit had previously con-
cluded that Rule 10b-5 was applicable to a "breach of fiduciary duty
owing by the majority to the minority. . . without a showing of mis-
representation or lack of disclosure." 302
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the merger itself was
107 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Royal Indus. v. Monogram In-
dus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,863 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 29, 1976) (defensive acquisition, the sole or primary purpose of which is to thwart
hostile bid, violates § 14(e)).
'" The high point of this approach to the federal securities laws was the Commis-
sion's action in promulgating for public comment proposed Rule 13e-3, which would
have required, if adopted, that the terms of "going private" transactions be substan-
tively fair to shareholders. See SEC Release No. 34-17,222, 45 Fed. Reg. 70,890
(1980). Section 13(e) empowers the Commission to adopt rules that "define acts and
practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" and "prescribe means rea-
sonably designed to prevent such acts and practices." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1982). It
followed, therefore, that if the Commission had decided to mandate substantive fairness
under § 13(e), it could have imposed substantive fairness requirements on bidders and
targets under § 14(e), since the language is similar.
2- 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
See generally Ferrara & Steinberg, The Interplay Between State Corporation
and Federal Securities Law-Santa Fe, Singer, Burks, Maldanado, Their Progeny and
Beyond, 7 DE.. J. CORP. L. 1 (1982); Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa
Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 263 (1980); Gorman, At
the Intersection of Supreme Avenue and Circuit Street: the Focus of Section 10(b) and
Santa Fe's Footnote Fourteen, 7 J. CORP. L. 199 (1982).
301 See 430 U.S. at 470.
303 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430
U.S. 462 (1977).
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neither a "deceptive" nor "manipulative" transaction within the mean-
ing of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.303 Both terms, the Court held,
as well as the statute as a whole, require that there be some element of
nondisclosure, either by misrepresentation or omission, before a corpo-
ration's behavior is actionable.30' Accordingly, the Court concluded
that, because the plaintiffs alleged no fault with the disclosure of the
transaction, they failed to state a claim under Rule 10b-5."0 5
Since the Santa Fe decision, the federal courts have rejected sev-
eral opportunities to characterize tender offer defensive tactics as
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" acts or practices and thus
violative of federal law.306 Only in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
ao See.,430 U.S. at 474.
The other principal antifraud provision, applicable to tender offers, is § 14(e) of
the Securities Exchange Act, which outlaws "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
acts or practices" in connection with any tender offer and gives the Commission
rulemaking power to adopt rules "reasonably designed to prevent" the occurrence of
such practices. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). Although the wording of §§ 10(b) and 14(e)
is not identical-§ 14(e) includes the term "fraudulent" while § 10(b) does not-the
courts have read these two sections in pari materia. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon
Oil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), rev'd on other grounds, 669 F.2d 366 (6th
Cir. 1981). But see Junewicz, The Appropriate Limits of Section 14(e) of the Williams
Act, 62 TEx. L. Rv. No. 7 (April 1984) (forthcoming) (arguing that the term "fraud-
ulent" in § 14(e) suggests that certain defensive tactics, at least those taken solely to
perpetuate control, violate § 14(e)).
Thus, this limit on the scope of § 10(b) also effectively limits the scope of § 14(e)
in the context of corporate behavior during tender offers.
304 430 U.S. at 474. The Court noted in this regard that it:
repeatedly has described the 'fundamental purpose' of [the Exchange Act]
as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure'; once full and fair dis-
closure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most
a tangential concern of the statute.
Id. at 477-78.
3o Id. at 474-77.
The Court decided that a contrary rule would:
bring within the Rule a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left
to state regulation. . . . Absent a clear indication of congressional intent,
we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corpora-
tions that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where estab-
lished state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.
Id. at 478-79.
306 For example, in In Re Sunshine Mining Co. Sec. Litig., [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. Ra'. (CCH) 97,217 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1979), the court held
that under Santa Fe there is no action under Rule 10b-5 or 14(e) against directors for
opposing and frustrating a takeover bid even though the directors were acting solely for
their own self-interest and totally in disregard of fiduciary duties to shareholders. Ac-
cord Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978);
Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Decisions subsequent to Santa Fe also have not allowed the Court's holding to be
undermined by allowing plaintiffs to allege that the board defrauded them by not dis-
closing that the transaction was in fact unfair, entered for a wrongful purpose, or in
breach of a fiduciary duty, all of which they knew or should have known. See R. HAM-
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Co.$07 has a court relied on the Exchange Act to prohibit a defensive
tactic employed in the context of a tender offer. There the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals was faced with a challenge to two "lock up agree-
ments" into which Marathon Oil had entered with United States Steel
after Marathon Oil had become a target of a tender offer by Mobil.308
The court held that the agreements were "manipulative acts and prac-
tices" under section 14(e) because they had "the effect of creating an
artificial price ceiling in the tender offer market" for Marathon's secur-
ities.3 09 The following syllogism captures the crux of the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning in Mobil:
(1) "Manipulation," as proscribed by section 14(e), means
any "artificial" action affecting the market price for a
security.310
(2) The Yates Field and stock option lock-up agreements
"artificially" affected the market price for Marathon stock
by interfering with free market forces and restraining bid-
ders for the company's shares311
(3) Hence, these lock-up agreements are "manipulative" and
thus violate section 14(e).
12
The Mobil rationale has been rejected by many courts,"1 ' perhaps
ILTON, supra note 16, at 892. Such disclosure of course would amount to a confession
of wrongdoing by the directors.
Courts have stated that directors are not required to disclose "true motives" in
engaging in the transaction. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221
(9th Cir. 1980) (no need to disclose motive "so long as motive is not manipulative or
deceptive and the nature and scope of any stock transactions are adequately disclosed to
those involved."); Rodman v. Grant Found., 608 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1979) ("much
support" for position that subjective interest of officers and directors need not be dis-
dosed); Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 765 (8th Cir. 1978) ("true motivation" of
management need not be disclosed).
3- 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
3U Marathon Oil Co., which in October, 1980, was the subject of a hostile tender
offer by Mobil Corp., began merger negotiations with United States Steel Corp. (USS).
USS, however, was apparently unwilling to plunge into a bidding war with Mobil, a
far richer combatant, without some competitive advantage. As an express condition, of
the merger agreement, USS demanded that Marathon give USS an irrevocable option
to purchase Marathon's 48% interest in the valuable Yates Oil Field (generally ac-
claimed as its "Crown Jewel" asset) for $2.8 billion exercisable, if anyone other than
USS acquired Marathon. USS also requested and received an irrevocable option to
purchase up to 10 million unissued shares at $90 per share. Id. at 369.
309 Id. at 375.
"10 Id. at 374 (emphasis in original).
all Id. at 375.
312 Id.
313 See, e.g., Buffalo Forge v. Ogden Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. Ra'. (CCH)
99,501, at 96,920 (2d Cir. Sept. 22, 1983) ("Marathon was an unwarranted exten-
sion of the Williams Act."); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp.
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because of its questionable legal foundation, 14 and has been criticized
by several courts and commentators as being unworkable and inconsis-
tent with Santa Fe.3 15 The disclosure underpinnings of current federal
law are emphasized in cases involving the legality of two-tier tender
offers, the coercive effect of which has been frequently criticized. One
district court stated: "'If the counter offer is in fact 'coercive,' it would
only be because its two-tier structure is revealed all too well."' 1
Thus, current federal regulation is largely limited to disclosure
requirements.
2. The Business Judgment Rule and State Regulation
After Santa Fe, any substantial regulation of corporate responses
to attempted acquisitions must be achieved at the state level. State regu-
lation, however, is not likely to be effective because the business judg-
ment rule is the method used to review those corporate actions. 17 This
623, 630 (D. Md. 1982) ("Mobil decision is an exceptionally strained interpretation of
Santa Fe."); Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
314 The Sixth Circuit's definition of "manipulation" is based upon a misconstruc-
tion of Santa Fe, overlooks the influence of full disclosure, and is without support in
case law or the legislative history of § 14(e) or § 10(b), the statutory relative of § 14(e).
In brief, Santa Fe states that manipulation "refers generally to practices. . . intended
to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." 430 U.S. at 476 (citing
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)). In formulating its definition,
the Sixth Circuit ignores the intention to deceive emphasized by the Court in
Hochfelder and Santa Fe. The court thus disregards the question of whether the option
agreements misled, deceived, or defrauded investors, a critical element of the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Santa Fe and Hochfelder. It is also difficult to see why such
"lock-up" agreements "artificially" affect market prices. Rather, their effect seems real
and concrete. The Sixth Circuit's view of what constitutes a practice "artificially affect-
ing market activity" amounts to the view that any corporate transaction having the
effect of increasing or decreasing demand for its securities is a prohibited manipulation.
See Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
315 See Nathan, Novel Legal Questions Explored, Nat'l Law J., Mar. 29, 1982, at
25, 30; see also Bialkin, Court Casts Cloud Over Option Tactic in Takeovers, Legal
Times of Wash., Jan. 11, 1982, at 19, 27.
316 Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Md.
1982).
317 The business judgment rule is, in fact, used to evaluate a whole range of cor-
porate decisions in the acquisitions area. In addition to the decision to engage in specific
defensive tactics, the decision of the bidder to commence a bid, the selection of the
subject company, the mode of the bid, be it tender offer or open market acquisition
program, the price to be paid, the number of shares sought, are evaluated under this
rule. Similarly, decisions as to whether the consideration is to be paid in cash or stock,
to incur any debt to finance the transaction, no matter how costly, are only reviewvable
in this way.
The business judgment rule has been discussed extensively by commentators. See
generally Brown, Recent Developments Relating to the Business Judgment Rule, 6
DEL. J. CORP. L. 538 (1981); Duesenberg, The Business Judgment Rule and Share-
holder Derivative Suits: A View From the Inside, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 311 (1982); Eisen-
berg, The Business Judgment Rule, 14 INST. Sac. REG. 251 (1983); Hansen, Business
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rule' articulated in various ways from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, pro-
vides in general that:
a court will not interfere with the judgment of the board of
directors unless there is a showing of gross and palpable
overreaching. A board of directors enjoys a presumption of
sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be dis-
turbed if they can be attributed to any rational business pur-
pose. A court under such circumstances will not substitute its
own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment.""
Because of the importance of this rule in the review of corporate
defense tactics, an assessment of its effectiveness in this context is
timely.
a. Applicability of the Rule to Tender Offer Defenses
Before evaluating the elements of the rule, it is questionable that
the rule should even apply to decisions to resist a tender offer. The
business judgment rule originated to test decisions made by directors to
maximize profits. When applied to such decisions, it is unassailable.
Shareholders give directors a broad mandate to manage or oversee the
business, which involves countless business decisions. Because meaning-
ful review of such decisions requires intimate financial and technical
knowledge of the company, its products, and its industry, it is under-
standable that judges would apply a test that provides substantial defer-
ence to corporate decisionmakers81 9 But it is not at all clear that the
same deference should apply when the decision under review relates
not to the company's day-to-day operations but to whether a bidder
should be able to purchase stock from shareholders on a fully disclosed
basis. The directors mandate to make such decisions is far less clear
Judgment Rule and Maldonado [Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del.
1981)]-Another Perspective, 6 CORP. L. REv. 131 (1983); Higbee, The Misapplica-
tion of the Business Judgment Rule to Dismiss Shareholder Derivative Suits Against
Directors, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 589 (1981); Johnson, Anti-Takeover Actions and De-
fenses: Business Judgment or Breach of Duty?, 28 VILL. L. REV. 51 (1982); Veasey,
Seeking a Safe Harbor From Judicial Scrutiny of Directors' Business Decisions-An
Analytical Framework for Litigation Strategy and Counselling Directors, 37 Bus.
LAW. 1247 (1982); Veasey, Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Ac-
tions: Background, 6 DEL. J. CORP. L. 518 (1981); Walsh, Defensive Tactics and the
Fiduciary Obligations of the Target Board of Directors, 7 J. CORP. L. 579 (1982);
Comment, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule in Contests of Corporate
Control, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 980 (1982).
318 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (citation omitted).
819 See generally 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1039 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
[Vol. 132:647
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
than their mandate to run the company. Nevertheless, the courts have
used various formulations of the business judgment rule to evaluate
change-of-control decisions without analyzing or even acknowledging
this unique context. 20
The majority opinion in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.3 11 is an
example of this lack of attention to the important new context
presented by takeovers. In Panter, the directors of Marshall Field re-
jected a takeover bid made by Carter Hawley Hall (CHH) at a hand-
some premium over prevailing market prices and engaged in a number
of defensive maneuvers designed to thwart the upcoming bid, including
the acquisition of, a business likely to create antitrust law obstacles for
CHH. 22 The two-judge majority upheld the directors' conduct by a
straightforward application of the business judgment rule. 23
Judge Cudahy, in dissent, argued that a court's role in evaluating
decisions to discourage changes in control should for sound policy rea-
sons be more intrusive than its role in evaluating day-to-day manage-
ment decisions." ' He sharply criticized the majority for "adopt[ing] an
approach which would virtually immunize a target company's board of
directors against liability, provided that a sufficiently prestigious (and
expensive) array of legal and financial talent were retained to furnish
post hoc rationales . "... I25
Judge Cudahy argued that a more rigorous test should apply in
change-of-control cases in view of the undeniable self-interest of direc-
tors in any takeover attempt and favored the following rule:
31 See generally sources cited supra note 317.
321 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
312 Id. at 278.
323 Id. at 297. The court held that:
[dlirectors of corporations discharge their fiduciary duties* when in good
faith they exercise business judgment in making decisions regarding the
corporation. When they act in good faith, they enjoy a resumption of
sound business judgment, reposed in them as directors, which courts will
not disturb if any rational business purpose can be attributed to their
decisions. In the absence of fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching or abuse
of discretion, courts will not interfere with the exercise of business judg-
ment by corporate directors. -
Id. at 293 (emphasis added) (quoting the district court, 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D.
Ill. 1980) (citations omitted)).
324 Judge Cudahy stated that day-to-day management decisions "'involve[] corpo-
rate functioning in competitive business affairs in which judicial interference may be
undesirable."' The decisions about change in control were seen by Judge Cudahy as
"'involv[ing] only the corporation-shareholder relationship, in which the courts may
justifiably intervene to insist on equitable behavior.'" Id. at 299-300 (quoting Note,
Protection for Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of Publicly Held Companies,
58 COLUM. L. REv. 1030, 1066 (1958)).
325 Id. at 299.
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Once a plaintiff has shown that the desire to retain control
was 'a' motive in the particular business decision under chal-
lenge, the burden is then on the defendant to move forward
with the evidence justifying the transaction as primarily in
the corporation's best interest.3 2
Despite this and other arguments favoring closer scrutiny of defen-
sive tactics,327 the law seems to be the "any business purpose" standard
set forth by the Panter majority.
3 28
b. Effectiveness of the Rule in Regulating Tender Offers
The business judgment rule is a rule of retroactive, not prospec-
tive, application. It amounts to a doctrine of judicial abstention from
inquiry into the merits of business decisions so long as (a) the directors
act in "good faith" and (b) a "rational business purpose" may be at-
tributed to the decision under review. Analysis of the operations of the
rule in modern takeover battles indicates that it fails to provide the
analytical framework necessary to give officers and directors adequate
guidance and to enable courts to conduct appropriate review of business
decisions of enormous importance to the shareholders of the issuer and
to the economy as a whole.
(i) The "Good Faith" Element
The good faith element of the business judgment rule was formu-
lated to strip the rule's presumption of validity from an officer or direc-
tor who had engaged in "self-dealing" or who had a "material personal
interest" in the outcome of the transaction. 29 Once the lack of good
faith is shown, the decision is not automatically condemned as null, but
it is declared suspect, and the burden shifts to the officer or director,
who must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
transaction was "intrinsically fair" to the corporation and its
3" Id. at 304 (quoting Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 301 (3d Cir.)
(Rosenn, J., dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981)).
327 For example, in Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975), the
court of appeals approved the application of a rigorous rule which required directors of
a target company to demonstrate a "compelling business purpose" for their actions.
I E.g., Rosenzweig, The Legality of "Lock-Ups" and Other Responses of Direc-
tors to Hostile Takeover Bids or Stock Aggregations, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 291, 294
(1983).
I" Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93, 115-
16 (1979); Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980); Blake v. Nat'l
Research Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1972).
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stockholders.33 '
It is clear that a director's receipt of a valuable corporate opportu-
nity or association with the corporation in a profitable business transac-
tion raises sufficient doubt about the good faith element to require the
director to demonstrate that the transaction is "intrinsically fair" to the
corporation and its shareholders. It would seem therefore that a deci-
sion that materially enhances an officer's job security and long-term
financial security, like a decision to oppose a hostile takeover by a
raider committed to a thorough housecleaning, would receive the same
legal treatment. Instead, courts have increasingly concluded that the
presumption of validity remains intact even though the retention of cor-
porate control and position is the unquestionable effect of successful
defensive strategies.3 3 1 It is difficult to see, and no court has adequately
explained, why a "rational business purpose test" should apply in
change-of-control cases but not also in traditional self-dealing cases, or
conversely why the more stringent test applied in self-dealing cases is
not also applied in change-of-control cases. 3 2
In Johnson v. Trueblood,"-' the Third Circuit reasoned that, "by
the very nature of corporate life a director has a certain amount of self-
interest in everything he does ' ' s " and his obvious self-interest in the
retention of control would not, of itself, constitute bad faith.3 5 The
court interpreted the rule as "postulating that if actions are arguably
taken for the benefit of the corporation, then the directors are presumed
330 See generally Arsht, supra note 329.
"1 In part, courts may have reached this result because the recent cases have in-
volved situations in which a majority of the board of directors are not full-time employ-
ees. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). As a result of this status, they are presumed "disinterested"
and the transaction is treated as if it were an ordinary business decision. When evaluat-
ing boards containing a majority of outside directors these courts will not shift the
burden to the defendants unless the plaintiff can establish, again by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the director's "sole or primary purpose" underlying a defensive ma-
neuver is to "retain control." See, e..g, Panter, 646 F.2d 271; Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287.
33 In this regard, judges have also failed to explain why they are more willing to
review directors' decisions to termi'nate litigation against other directors than they are
decisions to prevent control shifting. In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779
(Del. 1981), the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the business judgment rule as the
appropriate standard for reviewing the decision of a committee of disinterested directors
(a so-called "special litigation committee") to terminate a shareholder derivative suit.
The court laid down the following test: (1) is the committee composed of independent
directors who acted in good faith after reasonable investigation?; and (2) does the re-
viewing court, after exercising its own independent business judgment, believe the ac-
tion should be dismissed? Id. at 788-89.
333 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
33 Id. at 292.
35 Id. at 293.
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to have been exercising their sound business judgment rather than re-
sponding to any personal motivations." ' Under this reasoning, which
has been applied by other courts in forms only insignificantly differ-
ent,337 the "good faith" element of the rule is effectively ignored in
change-of-control cases.338
Because the judgment of directors is undeniably affected by their
high professional and financial stake in the outcome of an acquisition
contest, 3 9 and the current bias against an uninvited bidder challenging
the right of a company to be independent, it is apparent that there must
be some new understanding of the good faith element of the business
judgment rule. Even attempts at more restrictive formulations of the
rule have provided only partial solutions to the problems presented by
the good faith element. Judges Cudahy and Rosenn, dissenting in
Panter and Trueblood respectively, formulated the rule so as to shift
the burden of proof "'[o]nce a plaintiff has shown that the desire to
retain control was "a" motive in the particular business decision under
challenge.' "304 This formulation is clearly more consistent with tradi-
tional applications of the rule. It does, however, suffer from problems
inherent in any rule that focuses on the subjective intentions of a group
of officers and directors.34'
888 Id. at 292.
8 See Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702-03 (2d Cir.
1980); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977) ("an issue of stock that has
the collateral effect of enhancing the power of incumbent management is not invalid if
the transaction has as its principal purpose some proper corporate goal"); McPhail v.
L.S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1958) ("it would be to 'strain at a gnat,
and swallow a camel,' 23 Matt. 24, for us to infer some improper, ulterior or selfish
purpose on the part of the directors" in stock issuance decision); Cummings v. United
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 204 A.2d 795 (1964) (transaction sustained
under business judgment rule because its principal purpose is a proper corporate goal,
even though collateral effect enhances power of management).
3' Rosenzweig, supra note 328, at 294.
" The financial interest of outside directors is admittedly less acute than that of
inside directors given the minimal fees such directors normally receive. Even outside
directors may, however, be interested in retaining the prestige and professional satisfac-
tion that comes from being a member of the board of directors of a well-known public
company. In addition, such directors probably have a bias against an uninvited bidder
challenging the right of the company to be independent.
40 Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 304 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy,
J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 238, 301 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Rosenn, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981)), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981). See also supra note 332..
841 For example, the rule formulated by Judges Cudahy and Rosenn requires that
the following difficult determinations be made. For which of the following must the
retention of control have been a motive: each director; a majority of the board; the
inside directors primarily responsible for presenting information, as well as legal and
financial opinions, to the board; or the board as a whole?
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(ii) Any Rational Business Purpose
By in effect reading the good faith element out of the rule, cases
like Panter and Trueblood have resulted in a review of corporate de-
fense tactics that focuses almost exclusively on the presence of "any
rational business purpose" for the board's decision. Yet, analysis of the
business purpose is itself freighted with ambiguities that preclude effec-
tive judicial review, appropriate guidance for directors, and protection
for shareholders.
Merely to articulate the legal test as the existence of "any rational
business purpose" raises suspicions about its adequacy. It is difficult to
contend that a test that is passed by proof of "any business purpose" is
an appropriate standard of scrutiny for whether the directors are loyal
to shareholders. To pass legal muster, the directors' reason need not be
particularly compelling or persuasive, or even the best of a variety of
rationales in supporting alternative courses of conduct.
The existence of a "rational" business purpose doesn't necessarily
mean that the shareholders' best interests have been served . 42 In prac-
542 Indeed, the nominal requirement of the business judgment rule that an action
be in the best interests of the corporation does not ensure protection of shareholder
interests. First, the rule permits management to look to a wide variety of possible con-
stituencies that may have conflicting, or at least inconsistent, interests. The interest of a
"corporation" may be identified by looking toward the interests of several constituen-
des, including management, shareholders, employees, and local communities. In fact,
under current law, the apparent interests of any of these disparate groups, divergent
though they may be, may support the decision of the board to oppose a takeover bid.
See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972) (directors' motive to
benefit public, the corporation, and employees); Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Di-
rector of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw. 1799, 1817 (1976). In particu-
lar, one noted takeover practitioner states: "It is reasonable for the directors . . . to
reject takeover on anyone of the following grounds:. . . (4) adverse impact on constitu-
encies other than shareholders." Lipton, supra note 275, at 122. The result is that the
full range of corporate responses, from recommending acceptance to engaging in the
most vigorous financial defense tactics, can be justified under this purpose test.
For example, arbitrageurs, as shareholders, will always want the company to ac-
cept a hostile bid or sell to a white knight in order to maximize their short-term gain.
They are shareholders in name only. Employees, including those who own shares, may
wish management to take any action that will ensure continued employment, especially
if the hostile bidder is committed to or has a reputation for consolidations which may
result in an elimination of jobs. Long-term shareholders may believe, with manage-
ment, that the price is inadequate and will support a defense allowing the company to
remain independent in the hope that, by doing so, the corporation will realize its true
value. The community may want management to oppose the bid because of the possi-
bility that a significant plant may be closed or moved to another geographic location.
Second, as this example also indicates, even if one considers only the interests of
shareholders, the range of permissible responses may be just as broad. The class of
shareholders is likely to include long-term investors, employees, and arbitrageurs.
Finally, because these interests are not quantifiable, it is quite difficult to assess
whether, and to what extent, the shareholder, employee, or societal interests purport-
edly served by the board's action have been served in fact. See Gelfond & Sebastian,
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tice, it means simply that the directors need only adduce and document
a single, plausible reason to support their action, 43 and in almost every
transaction they can plausibly decide that the bidder's opening price is
inadequate (thus justifying defensive measures), because most bidders
reduce the value of their original bid to allow for a subsequent increase
that may be necessary because of negotiations or competition.
As one commentator has remarked, "[r]arely will a target corpora-
tion, particularly one advised by knowledgeable counsel, be unable to
devise a plausible business purpose for its conduct. 344
A more appropriate test of business purpose would be to require
the corporation's response to the tender offer to be evaluated according
to the rational purpose proffered or to account otherwise for the proba-
ble effect of defensive maneuvers on the ability of shareholders to Sell
their shares at a price that may far exceed the usual market price that
reflects the performance of current management. Courts currently seem
to assume that if any rational purpose is present, any response is ac-
ceptable. Directors are not required to justify each maneuver on a cost-
benefit basis, for example, whether the target's continued independence
was worth the interest costs on the debt incurred to finance an issuer
Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L.
REV. 403, 459 (1980).
The diversity of interests, plus the measurement difficulty, contribute to permis-
siveness since it is usually possible to find that any particular course of ac-
tion-including one that causes the hostile bidder to withdraw a handsome bid, e.g.,
Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 951 (N.D. Ill.), affd men., Nos. 82-
1305, 82-1307 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982)-may be in the best interests of at least one of
these disparate interests.
Part V of this Article discusses in greater detail the problem of responding to the
various constituencies with interests in a corporation when there is an attempt to ac-
quire control of the corporation. See infra notes 399-411 and accompanying text.
34 A major fault of the rational business purpose analysis is that it focuses too
much on the documentation that management is able to produce in support of its deci-
sion, rather than on the merits of the decision itself. See infra note 344.
14 Cohn, Tender Offers and the Sale of Control: An Analogue to Determine the
Validity of Target Management Defensive Measures, 66 IowA L. REv. 475, 499-500
(1981) (citations omitted).
It has also been argued:
The business purpose test poses a nearly insurmountable obstacle for
plaintiffs challenging defensive tactics. Regardless of the tactic employed,
management can easily manufacture a 'legitimate' corporate purpose for
its action, even when it employed the tactic solely to perpetuate its own
status. This is particularly true when management employs expert counsel
to lay a foundation for and to structure its actions.
Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 901, 926 (1979).
In fact, the failure of particular corporate actions to pass muster under the busi-
ness purpose rule is often attributed to the failure to provide the transaction with the
proper cosmetic appearance. See A. FLEiSCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RE-
SPONSES, AND PLANNING 88-26 to 88-34 (1980).
[Vol. 132:647
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
tender offer or counter tender offer.
In summary, current application of the rational business purpose
requirement contributes to an excessively permissive legal environment
because it affords directors unfettered discretion to select any of several
interests to be protected according to the end they actually hope to
achieve, requires primarily the articulation of an interest, rather than
any demonstrated performance in pursuit of that interest, fails to re-
quire directors to balance the advantages for one group against the dis-
advantages for another group, and fails to deal with the problem of
evaluating interests.
(iii) The Role of the Courts
As a common law rule of retroactive application, the business
judgment rule depends for its enforcement on the willingness of courts
to unravel, on an after-the-fact basis, consummated transactions often
involving billions of dollars. Even assuming that current formulations
of the business judgment rule are adequate, federal and state courts
alike appear reluctant, absent tighter standards, to disrupt or unravel
large transactions or to take action that might favor one side or the
other in a takeover battle. " 5 It is clear that the ambiguity of the princi-
ples involved exacerbates this tendency."'
This reluctance seems to be intensified when the plaintiff is per-
ceived to be seeking to interfere with normal marketplace operations or
where the result would be to impose large damages on individuals. Es-
pecially in the supercharged atmosphere surrounding hostile, billion-
dollar deals, courts face enormous pressure to do nothing. Time and
time again, courts reject attempts by plaintiffs to hold directors respon-
sible for deals that were not consummated because of their contuma-
cious conduct.3
345 See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 547 F. Supp. 533 (D. Md.
1982); Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
As former SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams observed: "[j]udges are, naturally,
not comfortable second guessing directors in complex and delicate areas, such as take-
overs, particularly when they may suspect that the judicial process is being used as a
bargaining chip in a larger game." Address by Harold M. Williams, Tender Offers
and the Corporate Directors, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH)
82,445, at 82,879 (Jan. 17, 1980).
348 In contrast, when the applicable legal principles are more precise, such as in
antitrust law, courts are more willing to play an activist role. See P. AREEDA, ANTI-
TRUST ANALYSIS 887-88 (3d ed. 1981) (discussing divestiture).
347 E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981); Pogo
Producing Co. v. Northwest Indus., Civ. No. H-83-2667 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 1983)
(issuer tender offer); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill.), affd
inein., Nos. 82-1305 and 82-1307 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982); Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co.,
Ltd., 517 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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3. Conclusion
Because of the limited reach of federal law after Santa Fe, state
law remains the primary if not exclusive source for determining
whether or not the board of directors of the target has breached any
duty in the defensive strategies it pursues or the charter and bylaw
provisions it invokes with respect to the bid.
State law, however, is hardly an effective limitation on the tactics
of target companies. The business judgment rule, when applied in the
new context of tender offers and acquisition programs, is simply not
conceived or applied in a way that adequately protects shareholders'
interests. Particularly in regard to the financial defenses,"" the views of
the shareholders are not required to be sought. Their only role is either
to vote the directors out, to sell their shares, or to institute litigation
challenging the action taken.
C. Possible Responses to Corporate Defense Tactics
Commentators have come forward with a number of proposals for
regulating corporate defense tactics. Some federal role in this area
seems necessary. If Congress were to act, there would be uniform stan-
dards applicable to all major corporations, Professor Cary's call for fed-
eral standards for management conduct would be answered,349 and reg-
ulatory differences among states would be eliminated. An important,
meaningful judicial review of board conduct would in all likelihood re-
sult.3850 Whatever proposal is selected, shareholders should have a more
significant role than they have today.
1. Absolute Prohibition on Defensive Tactics
The most extreme regulatory response would be to bar defensive
tactics absolutely or, put differently, to require absolute passivity. This
response would preclude incumbent management from taking any ac-
tion that has .the intended or unintended effect of frustrating the bid
(unless perhaps there was a potential violation of antitrust law) and
would thus invest the shareholders with unchallenged power to deter-
mine the success of the bid.
This response may not be desirable, however, because it would
deprive shareholders of the use of managers in two key fiduciary capac-
34 See supra notes 267-76 and accompanying text.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 696-703 (1974).
350 See id. at 700-01.
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ities. First, it would preclude management from rendering financial ad-
vice to shareholders regarding the attractiveness of the offer. Propo-
nents of this approach would contend that this is no significant
drawback because shareholders decide daily whether to sell shares in
the market without the benefit of management's counsel. Nevertheless,
the absolute prohibition seems inconsistent with current federal policy
that mandates that target management publicly announce its recom-
mendation with respect to a tender offer. 51 The current regulation re-
flects the policy view that management advice is valuable to
shareholders.
Second, an absolute ban on defensive tactics would deprive share-
holders of the services of managers as their bargaining agents. Manage-
ment would not be able to seek a bidder willing to make a higher bid
nor take any other action-for example, liquidation-calculated to re-
sult in higher per share payments to shareholders than the bidder is
offering.
The loss of management's bargaining services is likely to be espe-
cially disadvantageous to shareholders faced with a partial bid. Each
shareholder would have little choice but to tender to the partial bidder
because with their wide geographic dispersal and limited time for ac-
tion, shareholders could not act together to negotiate a better price. The
shareholder would thus be required to assume both that all other share-
holders will tender their shares, thereby passing control of the corpora-
tion to the partial bidder, and that, after obtaining control, the bidder
would either make no further purchases, permitting share prices to re-
turn to pre-tender offer levels, or acquire the remaining shares in a
second-step transaction (possibly undisclosed at the time of the initial
bid) or a short-form freezeout merger (if a high percentage of the
shares were acquired in the initial bid). The subsequent acquisition,
even if it occurs, would therefore be assumed to be at a lower price
than the first-step partial offer. This scenario would virtually ensure
that enough shares would be tendered to guarantee the success of the
initial bid.
3 52
An absolute ban on defensive tactics may yield significant advan-
tages, and thus may be a viable regulatory approach. If adopted, how-
551 See Commission Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1983); Schedule 14D-9,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1983).
'3' These deleterious effects of an absolute ban on defensive tactics would be cured
substantially by a provision requiring that a person that acquired a presumptive control
position in the target's stock, for example, 20% of the outstanding shares, make a tender
offer for all remaining shares at the highest price paid to acquire any share comprising
the initial control position. This proposition, which amounts to a prohibition of partial
offers, is discussed in Part II. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
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ever, shareholders will still be adequately protected only if it is pursued
in conjunction with a rule limiting partial offers. Prohibiting defensive
tactics would drastically reduce the inefficient and acrimonious litiga-
tion that accompanies most modern hostile tender offers. It would also
encourage target management to optimize share value, because defen-
sive tactics would no longer be available as a way to preserve financial
security.
2. Mandatory Managerial Passivity
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have proposed a less extreme
rule that "efforts undertaken by target management primarily to resist
a takeover bid should not even be susceptible of the justification that
they happen to benefit the target. Such efforts to resist should instead
be proscribed completely. ' '351 Under this approach, courts would pre-
sume that corporate actions that hindered an actual or expected take-
over bid were taken primarily to resist the offer. The burden of proof
would then shift to the target's managers to overcome the presumption
"by a substantial demonstration that their actions were undertaken for
the economic benefit of the target" and not "for the purpose of defeat-
ing the offer."' " Such blatant defensive tactics as shark-repellant char-
ter and bylaw amendments would be prohibited per se.355
This approach has been seen as a significant and undesirable shift
from the status quo, 8' because it places the burden on management to
justify its action as not "primarily" for the purpose of defeating the
takeover bid. In fact, one advantage of this passivity rule is that it ap-
pears to give management wide latitude to respond to a tender offer
through disclosure and various other defensive strategies, if it can
demonstrate that its primary purpose was to ensure that if the corpora-
tion were sold, it was sold at the right price. Indeed, because the first
bid of a hostile bidder is usually labeled "inadequate" by financial ad-
visers retained by targets, this test would likely not preclude many of
the financial transaction defenses.357 The real difficulty for a target,
however, would be to persuade the court that the financial transaction
was undertaken in good faith, particularly if the tactic resulted in the
collapse of the tender offer rather than a higher price for the shares.
Moreover, if the company were sold, it would seem hard to attack
35" Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 159, at 1198 (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 1203.
'5 Id. at 1203 n.122.
See Lipton, supra note 164, at 1024 n.30.
See supra notes 267-76 and accompanying text.
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golden parachute contracts awarded during the fray.
Courts would, under this approach, continue to have the difficult
task of discerning the subjective intentions of a management group. As
discussed in regard to the business judgment rule,58 determining the
subjective intention of a group may pose insurmountable problems.3 59
Also, objectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive: resisting one
bidder frequently involves finding another bidder willing to pay a
higher price. These interpretational problems aside, by focusing on
subjective intentions, rather than result, the approach suggested by
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel retains the heavy emphasis on the
quality of documentation, rather than that of decisionmaking, that
makes the business judgment rule easy to circumvent.
3. The United Kingdom Rule
No legislation regulates the making of takeover bids in the United
Kingdom. Rather, the tender offer process is governed by the Panel on
Take-Overs and Mergers, a self-regulatory body created in 1968 by the
Stock Exchange, the Bank of England, and members of the financial
and legal community. 6 The Panel relies largely on adverse publicity
and peer pressure to coerce compliance with the City Code on Take-
Overs and Mergers, which sets forth rules to be allowed by participants
in takeover contests.3"'
Two basic rules apply to defensive tactics. General Principle 4 of
the City Code generally prohibits defensive actions that (1) could frus-
trate any bonafide offer and (2) were undertaken without the approval
of a majority of the shareholders. 6 2 General Principle 38 specifies cer-
88 See supra notes 317-47 and accompanying text.
8" In this context, interesting questions arise if discovery reveals that a particular
board member intent on resistance-the Chairman, for example-wielded dispropor-
tionate influence over the board's decisions, or if a majority of the board acted to resist,
or if a tie between warring, but economically motivated, board factions was broken by
the vote of a venal director intent on resisting the takeover to maintain his corporate
position.
860 See De Mott, supra note 147, at 7.
861 See id. at 6-10.
868 Principle 4 provides:
At no time after a bonafide offer has been communicated to the board of
an offeree company or after the board of an offeree company has reason to
believe that a bonafide offer might be imminent shall any action be taken
by the board of the offeree company in relation to the affairs of the com-
pany, without the approval in general meeting of the shareholders of the
offeree company, which could effectively result in any bona fide offer be-
ing frustrated or in the shareholders of the offeree company being denied
an opportunity to decide on its merits.
Crry CODE, supra note 147 (General Principle 4).
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tain target company transactions that are prohibited when a tender of-
fer is in progress or imminent unless approved by a majority of the
shareholders. 363 These include many of the financial transactions al-
ready discussed' such as the issuance of previously authorized
shares,"6 5 or the sale or acquisition of significant corporate assets.
3 66
This British approach to defensive tactics differs from both of the
approaches previously discussed. Unlike the business judgment rule and
the Easterbrook-Fischel passivity rule, both of which rely upon judicial
inquiry into the subjective intent of target management, the British rule
is prophylactic, focusing on the prevention of certain effects determined
to be undesirable-that is, the frustration of bona fide offers. And un-
like an absolute prohibition, the British rule permits certain defensive
tactics if approved in advance by a majority of shareholders.
The role of shareholder approval in that system is interesting and
unique. Clearly, the approval by shareholders of particular defensive
tactics, even those that might frustrate a bid, brings egalitarianism to
takeover battles and ensures that at least those shareholders voting in
favor of the tactics consent to and assume the risk of any untoward
effects.
Such approval also raises, however, the troubling possibility that a
majority of the shareholders may vote to adopt tactics that harm the
financial interests of the minority or at least are inconsistent with their
desires. This problem may actually be transitory: shareholders that dis-
agree with the majority vote may sell their shares in the market, where
the shares will presumably be repurchased by investors who approve of
the majority vote or at least are willing to fight to change it.
4. Mandatory Shareholder Approval
A modification of the British rule would bar defensive tactics sub-
ject to the exception that shareholders could vote to approve the use of
any tactic or to adopt any behavioral rule for management ranging
from passivity to uncompromising resistance. If adopted, periodic reap-
proval of such provisions could be required, recognizing that the com-
position of the shareholder body changes over time. One criticism of
this modification (and the British system as well) is that management
may wield significant influence over the outcome of the vote because it
83 See CITY CODE, supra note 147 (General Principle 38).
a" See supra notes 267-76 and accompanying text.
385 See CITY CODE, supra note 147 (General Principle 38).
s See id.
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controls the proxy solicitation process.""7 This problem is compounded
by the fact that the Commission has been reluctant to allow sharehold-
ers to use Rule 14a-8 as a way of getting their own proposals (which
often favor takeovers) on the ballot. 8 '
Another criticism of the approach is that it may deprive the board
of the ability to bargain meaningfully for shareholders. Any company
adopting a no-resistance policy is likely to get lower-priced bids than it
would otherwise. That problem may be eliminated, however, if share-
holders empower their board to take only defensive maneuvers reasona-
bly calculated to increase the consideration received by shareholders.
This type of limitation on the board makes assessing defensive conduct
less difficult: one at least knows that shareholders wanted the directors
to react if they could increase the price, but did not necessarily want
the directors to have the discretion to remain independent at all costs.
Any system requiring shareholder approval of defensive strategies,
including compensation devices like golden parachutes, has several ad-
vantages. First, a rule based on shareholder approval accords with the
economic reality of tender offers. The shareholders are the real target
of the bid and they should logically determine the nature of manage-
ment's response, as the New York Stock Exchange suggested on one
occasion. 6 Second, a system based on shareholder approval gives
courts clear rules to apply in determining whether directors have acted
properly. Management also would know the precise extent of its discre-
tion when faced with a tender offer: shareholders would specify the
tactics permitted and the corporate constituencies that they wish to pro-
tect. These prospective guidelines for directors may reduce dependence
on the judiciary for developing standards of conduct. Finally, this ap-
proach would prohibit board approval of executive compensation agree-
ments triggered by changes in control. 70 Such agreements, which fall
under broad definitions of defensive tactics, would be permitted only if
each agreement specifically wins shareholder approval.
One major problem with this model is that shareholder approval
of defensive tactics would be nearly impossible to obtain once a tender
offer is underway, because the time period for completing the offer is so
367 See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CON-
TROL, 541-568 (2d ed. 1968); Berle, supra note 56, at 1213.
'" See R. HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 579-82.
369 See Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch. 1977), where the New York
Stock Exchange took the position that management should obtain shareholder approval
for a proposed repurchase of a sizeable, though noncontrolling, block from a dissident
shareholder. Id. at 561. The board did so but noted that it "did not feel that legally this
was necessary." Id.
370 See infra note 385.
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short. Thus advance authorization by shareholders may be the only re-
alistic alternative, and that authorization would have to be fairly gen-
eral because the precise nature of a potential bid will not be known. If,
as a result, directors simply submit the business judgment rule to share-
holders, their approval would have little, if any, impact on corporate
defense tactics.
Given the real disagreement about how directors should respond to
tender offers, requiring shareholder approval before defenses can be
undertaken lends legitimacy to such defenses when they are pursued.
This approval may be criticized as impractical or unrealistic. Still, the
legitimacy of director action is tied to shareholder approval, and we
should work to find ways to express that approval other than simple
election to office.
D. SEC Advisory Committee Recommendations
Although the climate was right for the Advisory Committee to ad-
vocate an aggressive federal role in takeover defense regulation the
Committee simply tinkered with the basic structure of the present regu-
latory system. The abusive defensive tactics developed in recent years
were addressed by specific recommendations. There was no more gen-
eral statement about what the obligations of directors are or should be
and no call for any fundamental reallocation of responsibility from state
law to federal law for reviewing the propriety of corporate decision-
making in change of control situations.
The most striking aspect of the Committee's work in this area was
its complete endorsement of the business judgment rule."7 1 As our dis-
cussion has illustrated,872 the business judgment rule, as currently ap-
plied in the change of control context, provides for no substantial re-
view of defensive actions by a target company's management. Although
the Committee acknowledged that the principal issue was whether a
new regime of federal corporate law should be created,837 the Commit-
tee provided no reasons to justify its confidence in the continued appli-
cation of the business judgment rule, as defined by state law. It merely
recommended retention of the rule as the "principal governor of [corpo-
rate decisionmaking,] including decisions that alter the likelihood of a
takeover."37 4 This may be the fundamental weakness of the report, par-
371 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 34 (Recommendation
33).
"" See supra notes 317-47 and accompanying text.
373 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 34-35.
374 See id. at 34 (Recommendation 33).
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ticularly in light of the insufficient analysis provided by the Committee.
The most significant change recommended by the Committee is
that Congress and the Commission adopt regulations that prohibit the
use of charter or bylaw provisions that place high barriers to changes in
control. $7 5 In the interim, the Committee recommended that companies
be required to adopt supermajority provisions by the same vote percent-
age contained in the provisions.8 "6 Furthermore, the Committee pro-
posed a requirement that such provisions be ratified by shareholder
vote every three years.3
7 7
The final step in the Advisory Committee's hybrid approach to the
problem of defensive tactics was designed to increase shareholder de-
mocracy. The Committee recommended that certain matters relating to
changes of control be submitted to the company's shareholders for non-
binding advisory votes.3 78 The matters include supermajority provisions
(to the extent not otherwise prohibited or restricted), disenfranchise-
ment, standstill agreements, and change of control compensation. 79
The results of the votes would have no legal effect on the company's
board of directors, and the Advisory Committee provided no guidance
about what effect the advisory votes would have on the operation of the
business judgment rule. Two Committee dissenters expressed their dis-
satisfaction with the nonbinding nature of the votes by commenting co-
gently, that "[o]pinion polls are far less effective than real elections in
eliciting the true position of the electorate."380 Given the questionable
value lof advisory votes, they suggested that the costs of requiring advi-
sory votes would outweigh the gains.8
The main problem with the shareholder advisory vote is that it
presumably leaves the business judgment rule, with all its disadvan-
tages, 'in place. Moreover, it may result in directors paying increased
attention to the expressed views of large shareholders. To the extent
that lrge shareholders already control the board, the advisory votes
3v See id. at 36 (Recommendation 35).
"I See id. at 36-37 (Recommendation 36).See id.
374 See id. at 37-39 (Recommendation 37). The shareholder advisory vote was
probably included because many observers have sensed that there has been significant
shareh6lder dissatisfaction with the reaction of directors to hostile bids. These directors
are puiportedly acting on behalf of shareholders who may want to sell their shares, yet
the directors do not consult shareholders about whether to pursue strategies that may
frustrate the bid (and their opportunity to tender). Moreover, the simple vote to elect a
director to oversee the business of the corporation does not necessarily convey, in the
mind of the shareholder, such unlimited discretion to block changes of control.
37 See id.
380 See id. at 104 (Separate Statement of Frank H. Easterbrook and Gregg A.
Jarrell).
x Id. at 104-05.
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could merely become a sounding board for entrenched management,
rather than a meaningful opportunity for smaller shareholders to influ-
ence corporate conduct. Accordingly, it is not surprising that several
commentators have criticized binding, let alone advisory, shareholder
votes as a meaningful protection for shareholders. 8 '
On the other hand, advisory votes would increase the information
available to directors about shareholders' wishes. Increased awareness
of shareholder attitudes would improve management decisionmaking
for "it would be a poor director who did not consider the views of
stockholders a relevant consideration." '88 In this respect, the measure
advocated by the Advisory Committee would improve the status quo.
A series of Advisory Committee recommendations respond directly
to potentially abusive defensive maneuvers. First, the Committee ac-
knowledged the argument that golden parachutes and other change of
control compensation agreements might make corporate management
more responsive to shareholder interests in the context of a takeover
attempt by insulating them from fears of job insecurity.'" Thus, in
spite of widespread public disenchantment with the practice, 85 the
Committee did not bar golden parachutes entirely. Instead, it proposed
that target management be precluded from adopting change-of-control
compensation agreements after a tender offer for the company had com-
menced. 8 ' The company would also be required to disclose the terms
of such compensation packages and submit any package to an advisory
vote of the shareholders. 8S
The Advisory Committee also deferred to arguments in favor of
allowing target management to negotiate special options or agreements
intended to induce a friendly bidder to compete with a hostile tender
offeror. The Advisory Committee found that such arrangements are
sometimes necessary to attract a second bidder and thus promote com-
petition. 88 As a result, the Committee's recommendation regarding this
practice was directed toward curbing abuses by requiring stockholder
approval for issuance of more than fifteen percent of a target company's
stock during a tender offer.38" This was not a particularly radical pro-
"' Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 299-300 & n.2 (collecting
authorities).
I' Berle, supra note 56, at 1223.
1" See ADVISORYI CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 39.
385 See Knight, Golden Parachutes Reward Corporate Failure, Wash. Post, Sept.
13, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
388 See ADVISORYCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 40-41 (Recommenda-
tion 38).
387 See id.
' See id. at 44.
' See id. (Recommendation 41).
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posal, however, because the New York Stock Exchange already has a
rule requiring shareholder approval for the issuance of more than
18.5% of a listed company's shares.3 90
The counter tender offer, or "Pac-Man" defense, would still be
generally available under the Advisory Committee's recommendations
even though the practice was criticized as destructive and wasteful in
light of the Martin-Marietta/Bendix fiasco. 91 The only situation in
which the Committee recommended prohibiting the use of the defense
was during the pendency of a cash tender offer for 100% of the target
company because there would be no shareholders left for the target's
management to protect.
39 2
The Committee failed to offer any new proposals for regulating a
target company's sales of significant assets ("scorched-earth defense"),
even when undertaken during a tender offer. Rather, the Committee
again ratified the business judgment rule as the primary device for po-
licing abuses of this type of takeover defense. 93
Finally, the Advisory Committee was particularly troubled by the
greenmail practice.'" As a result, it recommended prohibiting a target
company from repurchasing its stock at a premium unless the stock was
held for at least two years or unless the target's directors secured prior
approval of its shareholders. 95
The Committee's approach to regulation of defensive tactics seems
internally inconsistent. The Committee fully endorsed the business
judgment rule, while, at the same time, it prescribed specific federal
remedies for abusive defenses that have developed and been unassaila-
ble to date because of the protection that target management receives
under that rule. While perhaps solving today's problems, the Commit-
tee's approach appears to be fundamentally incapable of controlling
abuses that may develop along with inevitable, new defensive tactics.
The approach only tinkers with the current system, and such tinkering
may not be sufficient for a system that appears more fundamentally
flawed. The Committee's endorsement of the business judgment rule
without any supporting analysis more likely indicates a reluctance to
alter the allocation of regulatory responsibilities that currently exists
between state and federal government than a real intent to affirm any
, See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL A-284 (1983).
891 See ADVISORY COMMrTTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 42-43 (Recommenda-
tion 40).
"9 See id. at 43 (Recommendation 40).
4)S See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 45 (Recommendation
42).
s See id. at 46.
, See id. at 46 (Recommendation 43).
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strengths in the business judgment rule.
In its House testimony, the Commission accepted some and re-
jected other recommendations, yet no logical thread is discernible. For
example, the Commission would prohibit, absent shareholder approval,
company stock sales in excess of five percent during a tender offer or
proxy contest and also intends to propose legislation to bar defensive
issuer tender offers."9 6 On the other hand, the Commission believes that
counter tender offers and "Crown Jewel" asset sales, even amid a hos-
tile tender offer, should be permitted unless they violate the business
judgment rule. While it accepted the role of the business judgment rule,
it would revise its application in the change of control context, because
"shareholders would be better served if the courts gave greater recogni-
tion to potential conflicts of interest between management and
shareholders."
3 97
The Commission endorsed the recommendations with respect to
"greenmail" and golden parachutes. 8 ' But it refused to endorse, be-
cause of the resulting broad intrusion into state law, the Committee's
recommendation for advisory votes and for legislation prohibiting the
use of charter and bylaw provisions that erect high barriers to change
of control. 99
In sum, the Commission seemed to be torn between a desire to
avoid intruding into classic areas of state law and a desire to subject
certain strategies to further federal regulation. The Commission defer-
ence for state law may be excessive, especially if its price is further
toleration of egregious defensive tactics. As an aside, it is interesting to
note that the Commission's highly regarded war on insider trading is
based almost entirely on the "federalizing" of state concepts of fraud
and fiduciary duty.
E. Authors' Recommendations
The current regulatory system fails to provide the clear guidelines
necessary to promote responsible decisionmaking and to deter miscon-
duct by management in defending against tender offers. Due to the in-
herent self-interest of target management in the context of a hostile
takeover bid, more shareholder protection than that provided by the
present formulation of the business judgment rule is needed.
We contend that proper regulation of defensive tactics requires
'" Shad Statement, supra note 117, at 30-31.
-19 Id. at 11; see also id. at 31.
SO Id. at 31 (greenmail); id. at 28-29 (golden parachutes).
399 Id. at 27 (advisory notes); id. at 23 (charter and bylaw provisions).
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that the rules differentiate between full bids and partial bids. As noted
in Part II, partial bids present unique concerns for shareholder welfare,
including the possibility of looting and overreaching. Those possibilities
are presented by virtually any partial bid and may justify defensive
strategies that are not justified when the bid is for all outstanding
shares. These special concerns are obviously absent when the bid is for
all outstanding shares, because there is no profit in looting a corpora-
tion of which one is the sole owner.
We therefore propose dual regulation of defense tactics that re-
sponds to the special problems of partial bids, provides a framework for
meaningful scrutiny of the tactics, and permits shareholders to deter-
mine the board's response. This is tentative, as must any proposal be
which suggests major changes in the current system, and is proposed to
stimulate discussion.
When faced with a full tender offer, the board's primary response
should be either to recommend acceptance of the offer or to attempt to
find another bidder willing to offer a higher price for all outstanding
shares. In negotiating with other bidders, the board may not sell, or
grant options to buy, particular corporate assets, unless it makes similar
arrangements available to the original bidder in an effort to induce that
bidder to raise its price.
The board should not otherwise be permitted to engage in any
action that could frustrate the initial bidder without express share-
holder approval.
When faced with a partial tender offer, the directors may (1) try
to find a bidder willing to buy all of the shares of the company, or a
greater percentage than the original bidder is offering to buy, or (2)
take measures calculated to frustrate the initial bid (including the par-
tial liquidation of the company or the sale of particular assets). Any
effort to frustrate the bid can be undertaken only if it (1) is intended to
meet a business purpose approved by the shareholders in advance, and
(2) is reasonably related to the achievement of that purpose.
The directors should then have the burden of proving that the
shareholders approved the purpose underlying their action and that the
action was reasonably related to the achievement of that purpose.
This proposal is superior to the present system for several reasons.
First, and most importantly, it reestablishes the shareholders as the pri-
mary decisionmakers when a tender offer is made for their shares. It
differentiates between decisions regarding the proper management of
the business, which would continue to be scrutinized according to the
business judgment rule, and the fundamentally different decision to
transfer control of the enterprise, which should remain the province of
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shareholders.
Second, the proposal gives directors clear rules to follow and estab-
lishes that their primary purpose is to maximize returns for sharehold-
ers. Third, it subjects the actions of directors to a standard of review
that courts may easily apply. Finally, it promotes an auction market for
the shares (and assets) of the corporation which should lead to purchase
by those willing to pay the most for them.
Finally, it is important that Congress act to solve the greenmail
problem by prohibiting the repurchase by issuers of stock at premium
prices absent express shareholder approval. It is hard to understand
why a two-year holding period, such as the Advisory Committee rec-
ommends, should purify the transaction such that it becomes proper to
dispense with shareholder approval. The benefits of shareholder ap-
proval are more rigorous oversight of the price that management is
willing to pay and deterrence of this greenmail because shareholders
may be reluctant to approve the repurchase unless they are allowed to
participate. The costs to the issuer are those associated with preparing
proxy materials.
Issuers should still be permitted to buy shares in the marketplace
periodically to reacquire shares for options or because the shares are, in
the judgment of management, underpriced. Thus, the shareholder ap-
proval requirement should probably be invoked for positions of a cer-
tain size sold to the company in a negotiated transaction.
V. IMPACT OF ACQUISITIONS ON CONSTITUENCIES OTHER THAN
THE TARGET'S SHAREHOLDERS
Recent mergers and acquisitions have spawned considerable public
concern over the impact of acquisitions on the shareholders of the bid-
der, the national and local economies, and the employees and creditors
of acquired companies.400 The current regulatory system, comprised of
antitrust law, federal securities law, and state corporate law, does not
respond to those interests. 40 1 This lack of responsiveness stems from no
lack of diligence in enforcing existing laws, but rather from the fact
that the existing regulatory system was not designed with these con-
cerns in mind. This section first discusses the relevance of those constit-
400 See, e.g., Proposed Purchase of Marathon Oil Co. by Mobil Oil Corp.: joint
Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Behr, Takeovers: A
Need for Controls?, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1984, at D9, col. 1; Cohn, supra note 344, at
507.
401 E.g., Conoco, Inc. v. Seagram Co., Ltd., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
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uencies, and then considers alternatives for protecting them assuming
that Congress determines to do so.
A. Neglected Constituencies
1. Shareholders of the Acquiring Company
Tender offers precipitate cataclysmic changes in the shareholder
composition of the target company; the very commencement of the offer
provokes a sharp increase in market purchases and sales as professional
investors quickly amass large holdings to tender to the original bidder,
or perhaps to a competing bidder. And the shareholder population
changes once again when the bidder purchases tendered shares. In con-
trast, the shareholders of the offeror remain relatively constant before,
during and after the bid.
State law permits the offer to be financed, commenced and con-
summated without the approval of the bidder's shareholders. Yet the
decision to acquire another company may have enormous economic con-
sequences for them. The market value of their shares may be markedly
reduced as the result of debt incurred to finance the acquisition.402 The
bid will divert corporate resources from other possible uses;403 further-
more, the acquisition of a company in another industry may dramati-
cally change the character of the bidder's business operations, with a
corresponding cut in operating efficiency.4 4 The most surprising recent
concern, voiced by academic economists, is that "there is little or no
evidence that the primary objectives sought in mergers-greater econo-
mies of scale and productivity, increased profitability and improved
stock performance-are being attained to any significant degree."40 5
2. Employees and Suppliers of the Target Company
The directors of the target of the bid unquestionably have a fiduci-
ary duty to act in the best interest of shareholders. Far less clear is
their responsibility and authority to protect the interests of employees
and suppliers who may have a significant economic stake in the result-
ing business combination. Whether directors should have the legal au-
thority to oppose a bid on the grounds that it is not in the best interests
402 Martin-Marietta borrowed nearly $1 billion to finance its bid for Bendix.
403 Speech by Harold M. Williams, "Tender Offers and Corporate Directors,"
reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,445, at
82,877 (Jan. 17, 1980).
'I" Murray, Do Mergers Make Sense?, Dun's Business Month, Oct. 1982, at 88-
90 (discussing recent acquisition of Conoco, Inc. by E.I. de Nemours Dupont).
405 Id. at 88.
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of employees in nonexecutive positions is the subject of debate.406
This interest may warrant explicit government recognition. In-
deed, the City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers, which regulates the
conduct of tender offers in the United Kingdom, specifically instructs
the directors of a company faced with a bid to consider the interests of
employees and creditors, along with those of shareholders, in determin-
ing the company's reaction to a bid.4"'
3. Economic and Social Interests of the Affected Community
Mergers and acquisitions also affect the welfare of the community
in which the target company conducts its operations. The business com-
bination may result in antitrust problems which require the divestiture
of plants. Melding the acquired corporation with the acquiror may re-
sult in the transfer or dismissal of key employees. These events directly
impact the local community by decreasing (or increasing) tax revenue
or affecting unemployment compensation payments. These events indi-
rectly affect the local community in ways more subtle but no less signif-
icant. Employee transfers may diminish the revenues of local businesses
that supplied goods and services for the subject company's employees.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,40 8
noted that when corporate headquarters are relocated as the result of
an acquisition, "the state and locality from which the transfer is made
inevitably suffer significantly.
40 9
Courts have determined that these interests may warrant legal
protection in the takeover context4 0 as well as in other, more general
contexts.411
406 Compare Lipton, supra note 275, at 105-06 (defending responsibility to em-
ployees) with Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 159, at 1190-92 (rejecting any obliga-
tions to employees and other nonshareholder groups).
407 See Crry CODE, supra note 147, at 15 (General Principle 11).
4- 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
409 Id. Justice Powell explained: "Management personnel-many of whom have
provided community leadership-may move to the new corporate headquarters. Contri-
butions to cultural, charitable, and educational life-both in terms of leadership and
financial support-also tend to diminish when there is a move of corporate headquar-
ters." Id. See also Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 342, at 458.
410 See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972). In Herald,
the court expressly held that directors-at least directors of certain kinds of corpora-
tions such as newspariers-have an obligation to "employees, and to the public," in
addition to their duty to stockholders. Thus the directors in that case were justified in
averting a takeover which they believed would have "an adverse impact on the charac-
ter and quality" of the newspaper, and would lead to "poor relations with employees."
Id. at 1092.
411 See, e.g., American Rolling Mill Co. v. Comm'r, 41 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1930);
Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922) (both cases
holding that it is within legitimate business purpose of corporations to make contribu-
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B. Protection of Non-investor Constituencies
Reevaluation of tender offer regulation should include discussion
of whether new regulations should specifically protect in any way those
constituencies now recognized by federal case law. Even if one believes
these constituencies should be recognized, there is still the important
question of how they should be protected. Current formulations of the
business judgment rule might permit, but certainly do not require, tar-
get company directors to consider the interests of employees, local econ-
omies, and others in planning defensive action. Possible consideration is
certainly not a surrogate for participation. Similarly, adoption of the
proposal requiring shareholder participation in decisions to commence
or resist a takeover bid will not necessarily help because shareholders
may not consider those interests.
The most important proposal in this area calls for federal legisla-
tion that would, if enacted, charge a federal governmental agency with
protecting these constituencies in mergers and acquisitions. On July 13,
1983, Representatives Rodino and Seiberling introduced H.R. 3561412
that would establish a public interest test, to be administered by the
Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission, for acquisi-
tions resulting in a company having more than $5 billion in assets and
more than 25,000 employees. In determining "whether it is unlikely
that any acquisition would serve the public interest," and thus whether
judicial relief is necessary, the Assistant Attorney General (in charge of
the Antitrust Division) or the Federal Trade Commission "may con-
sider the views of any person, including parties to the transaction, their
employees, their customers and interested agencies of Federal, State,
and local governments.""'1 Matters for consideration expressly include
the effect of the acquisition on the effective management of corporate
assets, the offering of new goods or services, 414 whether the acquisition
tions and establish programs for the benefit of employees and the community in which
the corporation operates); Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50
B.U.L. REv. 157 (1970); Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REv. 1145, 1160 (1932) ("those who manage our business corporations
should concern themselves with the interests of employees, consumers, and the general
public, as well as of the stockholders").
412 H.R. 3561, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). This bill, if adopted, would add a-
new section 7B to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
418 § 7B(d)(2), H.R. 3561, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
414 This factor likely springs from concern over the size of tender offer premiums.
The size of recent tender offer premiums, sometimes amounting to 50% to 100% of past
stock prices, is difficult to explain on the basis of resource efficiency or modem eco-
nomic thinking. In 1980, the then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion noted: "These are resources that do not flow back as new capacity, improvements
in productivity, innovation, new products or new jobs. Rather,. . . at best these dollars
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would unduly disrupt management or employees, and, in light of prob-
able benefits, result in excessive fees or other transaction costs.
H.R. 3561 is a response to the growing national concern over the
troubling impact of recent successful tender offers on the shareholders
of bidders, the employees and creditors of target companies, and the
health of local economies. Although such legislation has far to go before
adoption, it signals the discomfort of legislators with current regulation
and with the highly publicized acquisition battles in which it is difficult
to discern whose interests are being served.
C. SEC Advisory Committee Recommendations
The Advisory Committee on Tender Offers provided no substan-
tial analysis and made no recommendations concerning the additional
constituencies affected by acquisition.
D. Authors' Recommendations
Despite the lack of Committee consideration, legislators consider-
ing proposals springing from the Committee's deliberations are cer-
tainly likely to focus on non-investor constituencies. The adoption of
legislation to protect these groups could, in fact, have effects on the
conduct of mergers and acquisitions that far surpass those of the pro-
posals discussed in the other sections of this Article.
If protection of new corporate constituencies is needed, it is not
remain in the secondary market." Speech by Harold M. Williams, Tender Offers and
Corporate Directors, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,445,
at 82,877 (Jan. 17, 1980). The efficient market hypothesis holds that the current mar-
ket price reflects all available public information about the company. See generally
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 159, at 1166 n.15 (collecting authorities).
These findings raise serious unresolved questions about the appropriateness of
premiums that vastly exceed current market value. The application of these economic
theories and findings to other legal areas has spurred a reassessment of past practices
and has led to the proposal of new legal rules to govern the behavior of brokers and
dealers, see, e.g., Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976
AM. B. FouND. RESEARCH J. I (discussing the extent to which a trustee may invest a
trust's corpus in a market fund without violating the legal standards that govern the
investment of trust assets); Pozen, Money Managers and Securities Research, 51
N.Y.U. L. REv. 923, 928-53 (1976) (discussing the application of portfolio theory to
limit purchases of investment research by money managers), trust managers, new dis-
closure systems for investors, see, e.g., Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities
Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAw. 293 (1975) (suggesting the application of portfolio
theory to securities disclosure), and pension plan beneficiaries, see, e.g., Junewicz, Port-
folio Theory and Pension Plan Disclosure, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1153, 1221-33 (1978);
Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule under the Employment Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARv. L. REv. 960, 966-69 (1975). Perhaps
these economic findings may suggest a rationale for the legal evaluation of tender offer
premiums as well.
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clear why bargaining with the corporation, perhaps with shareholder
approval, isn't the answer. If, however, legislation is deemed necessary,
H.R. 3561 seems inadequate. First, it provides no standards that man-
agers may follow in planning acquisitions or that regulators may follow
in evaluating them. Also, the proposal is only applied retrospectively
and therefore creates possibilities for delays in business transactions.
Second, the bill would require government officials somehow to decide
if the beneficial effects of a merger on one constituency outweigh the
detrimental effects on another. That decision would clearly become
politicized to the overall detriment of the economy.
CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the ever-changing landscape of tender
offer practice. Each new regulation, while ,adopted to stop a specific
abuse, becomes the subject of intense scrutiny by tender offer lawyers
and investment bankers constantly in search of strategies that will yield
a competitive edge in the next deal. This process has resulted in enor-
mous changes in the mergers and acquisition marketplace that require
a thorough review of the current federal and state regulatory system.
This Article concludes that the following regulatory reforms merit
serious consideration in efforts to make current regulation of mergers
and acquisitions more responsive to marketplace realities. The Advisory
Committee recommended that its proposals be implemented as a pack-
age, by Commission rulemaking and new legislation. The Committee
warned against implementing its proposals on a piecemeal or selective
basis because the compromise it achieved resulted from the balance re-
flected by the package as a whole.
In our judgment, however, Congress should hold broad hearings
on the issues discussed in this Article and acquisitions in general, not
just on the Committee's recommendations. Congress should consider
legislation giving the Commission plenary rulemaking power in the
tender offer area comparable in scope to its authority under section
14(a). This Article has suggested the following comprehensive set of
reforms that ought to be considered either by Congress or the Commis-
sion (if it gets new rulemaking authority), in determining how best to
regulate the acquisition of corporate control:
1. Congress and the Commission should change the structure of
the Williams Act and implement the Commission's 1980 legislative
proposal4 15 or the proposal of the Advisory Committee, 16 which re-
415 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
411 See ADvIsoRY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 23 (Recommendation
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quires that stock accumulations in excess of a certain percentage be
done by means of a tender offer.
2. Congress and the Commission should consider the role of the
partial bid. At a minimum, the use of two-tier tender offers that do not
offer substantially equivalent consideration in each tier should be pro-
hibited. This measure would eliminate the coercion of two-tier offers
yet preserve the economic advantages of such offers.
3. The rationale for uniform regulatory treatment of negotiated
and hostile deals should be reconsidered. Disclosure should be similar
and not depend on the form of the transaction. Presuming that directors
will act to protect subject company shareholders, it is difficult to see the
reason for the same minimum time periods and disclosure requirements
in negotiated transactions as exist in hostile, transactions. Negotiated
transactions seem far more efficient and productive than hostile trans-
actions, which are often fraught with litigation and waste.
4. Courts will be reluctant to interfere with decisions taken by
directors so long as they feel bound to apply a rule of law which affords
directors such wide discretion. The wisdom of such a rule is unassaila-
ble in the context of a decision relating to conducting the company's
business. But its applicability is questionable in the context of a change
of control since the director's common law fiduciary duty does not em-
body the mandate to frustrate tender offers. Therefore, mechanisms
should be considered for securing shareholder approval of the conduct
to be pursued by directors. Given the current time periods applicable to
bids, such approval is only realistic if secured in advance.
The range of responses of directors to a hostile tender offer should
vary depending on whether the tender offer is made for all the shares
or only for part of the outstanding shares. The directors' principal op-
tion in response to the former should be to find a third party willing to
pay a higher price for all the outstanding shares. The board may pur-
sue other interests, for example, corporate independence, only with the
express, specific approval of a majority of shareholders.
Partial offers present special concerns, and directors should have
greater latitude in responding to them. In response to partial offers,
directors should be permitted to find a third party willing to pay a
higher price, and to take action calculated to frustrate the bid, provided
that such action pursues a business purpose approved by the sharehold-
ers in advance and is reasonably related to the achievement of that ob-
jective. The directors should have the burden of proving that the share-
holders have approved the purpose underlying the action and that the
action was reasonably related to the achievement of that purpose.
5. Current federal regulation is designed to protect shareholders
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faced with a takeover bid. Left largely unprotected are noninvestor con-
stituencies: employees, creditors, and local economies. Consideration
should be given to these interests in the development of future
regulation.
The traditional approach of government regulation in recent times
has been to respond to abuses by the adoption of highly specific rules of
conduct. In the tender offer field this approach has led to an enormous
complexity of regulation, and has resulted in today's rules developed in
response to yesterday's transactions being ineffective or irrelevant in
controlling tomorrow's variations. The replacement of this approach
with a philosophy of generalism that favors the control of conduct
through normative rules of behavior and which specifies with some cer-
tainty the roles of directors and shareholders would diminish the depen-
dence of the current system on lawyers and, litigation.

